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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE POLITICS OF CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY:
NATO TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BY

©

JAMES DANIEL HUMEN

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Edmonton, Alberta

FALL 1992

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James Daniel Humen
103 Wilken Road
Edmonton, Alberta
T6M 2H4

Date: 9 Oct 1992

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE POLITICS OF CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY: NATO TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS submitted by JAMES DANIEL HUMEN in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.

Associate Professor T. Keating

LR Pratt

Professor L. Pratt

Professor R. Macleod

Date: 9 Oct 1992

ABSTRACT

THE POLITICS OF CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY: NATO TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Politics of Canadian Defence Policy: NATO to Nuclear Weapons explores the relationship between various bureaucratic organizations and the formulation of defence policy. Specifically the roles of the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence are discussed in relation to the mechanisms of policy formulation and the outcome of the policy formulation process. The chronological framework is approximately 1945-1963.

Organization is so as to reflect the chronology of the period. The exception to chronological organization is Chapter two, "The Essential Unity Between Defence and Security Policy," provides the theoretical basis for the thesis. Security policy is described as acceptance of the overall security environment which lesser powers such as Canada have little relative ability to change or modify. Defence Policy, conversely, is a particular states' response to the prevailing security environment. Greater freedom of action for lesser and middle-power states is maintained in the formulation and determination of defence policy.

Throughout the chronological discussion issues and events are explored. These events include the Canadian involvement in and signing of the North Atlantic Treaty; the integration of continental defence measures; the signing of the North American Aerospace Defence Agreement and; the various weapons procurement issues of the day, including the nuclear weapons acquisition controversy. Each particular issue is examined in light of the bureaucratic friction and conflict which resulted. It is generally asserted that a lack of consensus and a unified appreciation of the prevailing security environment impaired coherent policy formulation. Such a lack of a coherent policy additionally resulted in a substantial gulf between the commitments undertaken as a result of international/multilateral agreement and the resources allocated or acquired in keeping with those agreements. It is further asserted that post-war Canadian defence policy exhibits consistency which is valid today.

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INTRODUCTION

For many Canadians the perceived unmilitary nature of Canadian culture and history serves to differentiate Canada from other members of the international community. While both Canadian culture and history may or may not be any more or less militaristic than other nation-state's, Canadian membership in the prevailing international system imparts, to a degree, certain characteristics which are common to all. Foremost amongst these characteristics is the conception of what some have termed "external egoism"[1] or more colloquially "national interest". In this view the interests of one nation-state's population will always be placed above competing or any other state's interests. The nation-state is the basic and primary unit within an international system which seeks to perpetuate and preserve it. A clear paradox emerges which has produced a condition of consistent tension, competition and warfare. Canada's participation in the international community is most acutely exhibited in its participation in both world wars and chronically in its ongoing formulation and execution of defence policies.

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[1] External egoism refers to the prevailing characteristic of the modern international system which places the claims, interests and rights of one nation-state's population over the claims, interests and rights of all other nation-states's citizens. David Beetham, "The Future of the Nation State" in, Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall eds., The Idea of the Modern State (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1987), p. 214

The manner in which a nation state satisfies its inherent egoism exposes in many general ways, the character of that nation-state. The varied approaches to the pursuit of security further belie this. Yet despite the variety of approaches, it remains that nation states must in some way provide for the defence of their interests both political and territorial. Security of the nation-state and the defence of its interests vis-a-vis other nation states are seldom far from any modern government's conscience.

Canadian governments have, by and large, exhibited a degree of consistency with regards to their quest for security in the post World War II international system. The conclusion of war in 1945 quickly gave rise to an international system characterized by a bi-polarity of competing states defined largely, but not exclusively, along ideological lines. Historical animosities temporarily suppressed by the requirement, militarily to defeat Nazi Germany, reappeared in the years immediately following World War II. Canada's history, culture, demography, and geography provided the necessary impetus for Canada closely to align itself along the western pole. Such an alignment and the emerging security environment required that Canadian defence policy be reassessed. Although the factors of history and culture appeared to have made the defence and security choices clear for Canada, choice nevertheless, did exist. Canada, conversely, could have sought a neutral path providing both the Soviet Union and the United States defence and security guarantees similar to those which Finland guaranteed the Soviet Union.[2] The choices which Canada made in the initial post-war, early Cold-War years serve to expose those forces which drove Canadian defence and security policy. Additionally, the choices which Canada made reveal the Canadian conception of Canada and its role in the international system.

Canada had emerged from World War II significantly different from the Canada which had declared war on Germany in the fall of 1939. The Canadian contribution to the defeat of Germany had been significant and as a result Canada assumed a position amongst the western allies which was significantly different from that position which it had occupied prior to the outbreak of war. Canada was militarily stronger than at any point in its history and related to that strength was the vast and rapid expansion of the

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[2] Neutrality as an option was not seriously considered at any juncture throughout the period under consideration. To become an essentially neutral state would have violated the basic precept of Canada's new found internationalism. Additionally Canada chose the most cost effective solution to its immense defence requirements. See Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1977); John W. Holmes ed., No Other Way: Canada and International Security Institutions (Toronto: The Centre for International Studies, 1986) and; Bruce Thordarson, "Cutting Back on NATO, 1969" in Don Munton and John Kirton eds., Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Ltd, 1992).

Canadian economy. In addition the relative position of Canada was greatly enhanced at the end of war in 1945 by the destruction which most European and many Asian countries had suffered throughout the war years. These factors combined, provided for a situation in which Canada enjoyed a degree of influence significantly greater than that which it had enjoyed at any juncture since Confederation.

Despite Canada's position in the newly emerging global structure Canadian influence was linked to those areas in which it had been most active during the war years and was similarly linked based on history and culture to the United States and Great Britain. The relative position of Canada was not, however, a result only of wartime experience. Canadian policy makers consciously sought to abandon pre-war isolationism in favour of an activist foreign policy. The "fireproof house" may have provided for territorial integrity but it had failed, either as a policy designed to keep Canada out of war, or as a policy, the aim of which was the defence of wider political and economic interests. Indeed, it was asserted, that Canada could best avoid the horror of modern war by active involvement in the international politics which it had avoided previously.[3]

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[3] Lester B. Pearson, Mike Vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p.25. The activism which Canada embarked on as a result of the events of World War II can be partly defined by what came to be known as the "functional principle". As early as 1943 Prime Minister Mackenzie King enunciated the idea that those (continued...)

The desire to enhance Canadian influence and prevent the outbreak of future global conflicts became realized in the principle of active internationalism via such concepts as functionalism and multilateralism. Multilateralism and its military expression collective security combined to provide the basis of post-war Canadian foreign policy.[4] The establishment of the United Nations had provided, for many Canadian policy makers, the vehicle through which collective defence and security could be realized. The realities of the bi-polar system and the structure of the United Nations, however, quickly mitigated that hope. The intransigence of the Soviet Union combined with its bellicose rhetoric prompted Canada, and other Western nations, to construct an organization of like minded states through which collective defence and security could be realized. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was born of the desire to effect national defence and security through collective and multilateral action, free of Soviet interference rather than

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[3] (...continued)
countries with interests in particular international realms should be accorded influence and responsibility commensurate with the degree of actual capability. Canada actively pursued this principle in the various post-war international forums, examples include; the United Nations, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, among others.

[4] Ibid.

via a blanket and unilateral American guarantee.[5]

From the outset it was not only concerns pertaining to defence and security which motivated Canadian policy-makers. While matters of defence and security were certainly of great importance, based on the events of the immediate post-war years, Canadian policy-makers sought an organization which could provide the order which they perceived the global structure as lacking. The Canadian government consciously sought to participate in the remaking of the global order. It was incumbent, they determined, upon each state to become actively involved in formal international organizations. Such involvement would temper extremism and limit the freedom of action of the great-powers. Conceptually associated with the principle of functionalism, this activist idealism spawned the great interest and faith placed in, initially, the United Nations and later NATO.

Canadian hopes for the United Nations remained largely unfulfilled as Cold-War animosities quickly paralysed the institution. In the face of such a paralysis Canada turned to the traditional Western Allies, in the hope that "like-minded" states could erect a structure which could realize the hopes which the United Nations had represented. The Canadian idealists, even the most pure, were faced, however, with the real and practical problems of defence. During the late 1940's and early 1950's a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States appeared likely. In the face of a potential third world war immediately on the heels of the Second World War Canadian policy-makers sought a structure which could: a) satisfy the inherent idealism of the Canadian approach; b) provide for the real and practical issues of defence and; c) restrain American freedom of action vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In each instance it was perceived that NATO could be that organization which could facilitate many Canadian foreign policy objectives.

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[5] Escott Reid, "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1949" in Canadian Foreign Policy edited by J.L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1986), p. 164.

From the outset many Canadian policy-makers perceived NATO as being a surrogate United Nations comprised of "like-minded" states devoid of the paralysis which Soviet involvement wrought. Canadian insistence on the inclusion of Article 2 of the NATO Treaty which encouraged non-military cooperation between Alliance members provides evidence of the Canadian attempt to create an organization which was not just military in nature. While Canadian policy makers did not seek to abandon the United Nations, they sought an organization which could advance particular political and economic interests in a multilateral forum free of Soviet, communist obstructionism.[6]

In reality, and it was quickly apparent, NATO has never amounted to much more than a military alliance. The military nature of the alliance quickly became paramount as the Cold-War grew increasingly more frigid and American interest in it intensified. Accordingly influence within the alliance largely became a measure of military contribution. The influence which Canada had enjoyed, based on its relative strength at the end of war in 1945, eroded as the European NATO partners rebuilt. The reconstruction of Europe was hastened by American dollars, in testimony of the importance which the United States placed on countering the Soviet Military threat. Thus the currency of influence within NATO became defence dollars and defence commitments. The erosion of Canadian influence was rooted in the unwillingness and to an extent the inability of Canada to contribute the resources which the purchase of influence demanded. Such an unwillingness stemmed from a prioritizing of economic resources and the ongoing debate within Canada over the proper response to the Soviet threat. Many were unconvinced of the requirement to mount an expensive and in this view futile military build-up, when only the economic revitalization of Western Europe would forestall its conquest. Nevertheless, the ability of the Canadian government to influence alliance policies was, and remained for many years, intractably tied to the military resources which it allocated, not only to NATO, but other western based defence arrangements. The gulf between Canadian policy objectives and the resources required both quantitatively and qualitatively combined to produce a foreign and defence policy which by the mid 1950's had become largely obsolete.

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[6] Ibid.

The growing inconsistency between policy and resources became most evident in the friction which resulted within Canadian governments of the time. Despite increasing friction within the government and frustration with its waning influence no radical changes in policy were undertaken. Attempts to correct the erosion of Canadian influence or alter the direction of policy were further exacerbated by disagreements within the Canadian bureaucracy regarding the steps or measures which were required to restore the post-war Canadian ability to effect or attain Canadian international objectives. Confusion and a lack of consensus within the bureaucracy served to render Canadian foreign and defence policy incapable of responding to changing international circumstances. The strains of such disarray became apparent in the defence and security issues of the late 1950's and early 1960's. The debate over the signing of the North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD), the cancellation of the AVRO *Arrow*, the cancellation of operation *Skyhawk*, the fighter aircraft acquisition and the nuclear weapons acquisition debates all served to expose a foreign and defence policy which lacked direction and consensus, and was increasingly unable to provide tangible benefit.

The lack of unity between political goals and the resources allocated to those goals, by the late 1950's increasingly characterized Canadian defence and security policy. Such a commitment-capability gulf, as it has been termed, served to produce an inconsistent and incoherent defence and security policy. Further, to the extent that overall foreign policy is dependent or linked to defence and security policy, it too lacked a firm basis. This characterization has largely remained consistent throughout the succeeding three decades.

The following study will examine those events in Canadian foreign and defence policy which span the immediate post-war period up to and including the nuclear weapons acquisition debate of the early 1960's. The aim of the following study is to demonstrate that the substantial gulf between the foreign and defence policy goals of the era and the resources allocated to achieving those goals arose and are exemplified in the historical events of this period. The various factors which contributed to the inconsistency between policy ends and means will also be examined. Principal emphasis will be placed on the lack of consensus which existed within the Canadian bureaucracy. Specifically, the competing visions and appreciations of collective members of the Department of National Defence and the Department of External Affairs will be examined. An attempt will be made to demonstrate that such competing visions were often responsible for a defence and foreign policy which could not adequately reconcile Canada's relative capabilities with either its international posture or national commitments.[7] The following chapter will attempt, first, to discern what is properly security policy and what is properly defence policy and will examine the extent to which policy makers can exert influence or effect change in either realm.

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[7] The approach adopted, in considering the events and issues of the era cited, can be deemed to be within the "bureaucratic politics" model of foreign policy decision making. This understanding exemplifies the role, influence and indeed power of the non-elected bureaucracy in effecting and determining policy. See Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, (Scarborough Ontario: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1985), and David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power, (Toronto: John Wily and Sons, 1983).

CHAPTER 2

The Essential Unity Between Security and Defence Policy

"Defence" and "security" are terms which are often used synonymously. Both terms, although relating broadly to matters of military policy and national integrity, differ in many subtle yet important ways. The lack of a terminological distinction between defence and security has, in the Canadian context, produced a false sense of unity between what is properly defence policy and what is properly security policy. The confusion which this false sense of unity has created is, in many ways, responsible for the lack of a coherent Canadian posture with respect to Canada's position in the global security framework. Lack of coherence has, in turn, produced a condition in which the commitments undertaken within the mostly political realm are inconsistent with either the quantitative or qualitative resources devoted to the commitment. In short political commitments are seen to drive capabilities rather than being mutually supportive.

The introduction to the 1987 Defence White Paper, Challenge and Commitment, attempts to demonstrate that Canadian security policy consists of "three major components: defence and collective security, arms control and disarmament and the peaceful resolution of disputes."[8] While the White Paper is correct in stating that security policy is something greater than the sum and posture of national military resources, it fails to define either the relationship between the three elements or the degree to which Canadian security policy is a product of realities beyond Canadian control. The Canadian response to the security environment of the immediate post-war period and in particular the stationing of standing forces in Europe, debate over the signing of the North American Air Defence Agreement and the fighter aircraft acquisition controversy all serve to demonstrate the degree to which inconsistencies between goals and resources existed. In each case Canada was responding to an environment which was defined by the superpowers and therefore beyond the abilities of lesser powers to alter substantially. The creation of the Security Council as an integral part of the United Nations system served to institutionalize the responsibility of the great powers to ensure global security and made clear the limited influence of lesser powers like Canada.[9]

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[8] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre), 1987, p. 4.

Security as a prevailing circumstance, therefore, is not an element of policy which can properly be considered under the national control of governments except, and with limitations, in regards to the superpowers. Security is a descriptive term denoting prevailing circumstance and as such security policy is the political response to the prevailing security environment.[10] In that security policy is primarily political it is essentially subjective and thus potentially divorced from either the realities of resources or capabilities. The abstract nature of security policy, therefore, allows states to formulate policies which may be inconsistent with national capabilities. When such a situation arises a gulf between the political goals of the state and the means of achieving such goals results.

With regards to the events and issues under consideration, the condition in which means were inconsistent with ends was further exacerbated by the lack of consensus within the Canadian bureaucracy as to the nature and proper response to the prevailing security environment. Not only were the political commitments as undertaken inconsistent with either the Canadian ability or desire to allocate scarce national resources to their attainment or fulfilment, but the end objectives of policy were incoherent and inconsistent as well. While the Canadian perception of international politics had a general focus, conflict and competition among bureaucratic elites limited the development of coherent and concerted policies. An inherent relationship exists between confused policy ends and inconsistent, inadequate or inappropriate resource allocation.

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[9] John W. Holmes, "A Glance at the Record", in Holmes ed., No Other Way: Canada and International Security Institutions, (Toronto: The Centre for International Studies, 1986), p. 37.

[10] Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers, (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1977), p. iii.

Defence denotes military capability which is largely objective in scope. While security policy is political in nature defence policy is based on the allocation of resources and thus the acquisition of capabilities. While security policy may be divorced from concerns of capability it cannot operate in isolation from them as defence policy is an integral part of the response to the prevailing security environment. If either policy is to be successful an essential unity must exist.[11] As Carl von Clausewitz is frequently quoted as pointing out, "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument"[12]. If, however, the political goals are inconsistent with the means, that policy is intrinsically flawed. Within the Canadian context Douglas A. Ross commenting in "American Nuclear Revisionism, Canadian Strategic Interests and the Renewal of NORAD," asserts,

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[11] J.L. Granatstein contends that Canada sought a role in NATO for other than military reasons. Foremost were considerations of diplomacy and influence. Defence policy as a result was simply "pulled along". In J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967 The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986).

> Canadian defence policy suffers badly from a major disjunction between the military means that have been designated for acquisition in the near future and the long term ends of foreign policy.[13]

The unity between defence and security policy is apparent in that defence policy represents the manner in which the "political purposes" established by security policy are achieved.[14] Clausewitz is again forthright,

> The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.[15]

Defence policy is not an end in itself. A political justification for the allocation of resources is necessary.

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[12] Carl von Clausewitz, On War eds., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 87.

[13] Douglas A. Ross, "American Nuclear Revisionism, Canadian Strategic Interests, and the Renewal of NORAD," Behind the Headlines, 1984 Vol. 39, No. 6.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Clausewitz, op cit., p. 87.

This is true both in conditions of peace and war. While Clausewitz may or may not have been writing exclusively about the relationship between political goals and the manner in which they are achieved *in bello*, the necessary nature of the relationship in peacetime is also clear. The nature of modern warfare and the necessity for both short and long term military planning ensures this. Preparation for war and assessment of potential adversaries is far more political, the rhetoric surrounding capability notwithstanding, than the actual pursuit of armed conflict.

Canadian post-war security policy has often been maligned for what some have termed its "theoretical parasitism".[16] In this view Canadian strategic thought is deemed to be dependent on the intelligence, analysis and ultimately the policies which that analysis gives rise to, of largely American theoreticians. The assumed dependence of a particular state's security and defence policy on the strategic analysis of others is not a condition which is unique to Canada. For most middle and lesser power states, it is a condition inherent in the position they occupy vis-a-vis that pole to which they have been closest in the tight bi-polar structure of the post-war world. A danger exists, for scholars and observers, in "exaggerating the extent to which Canada's policies result from its national decisions, rather than from external factors over which it had little or no control."[17]Smaller powers such as Canada have little latitude to effect changes to the overall structure but do retain, depending on political will, the incipient capability to respond to the security environment as is deemed appropriate, limited by objective factors, some of which have been identified. Without commenting on the desirability of such a situation it remains that Canadian security policy in the post-war period is largely of external origin.[18]

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[16] See Colin S. Gray, "The Need for Independent Canadian Strategic Thought" in Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol 20 No.1 (August 1990) reprinted from Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol 1 No.1 (Summer 1971).

Although some states have greater relative latitude in determining national security policy than has Canada, Canada has been restricted by a number of factors; these include: Canada's relative economic and military power, history, geography, ideology, culture and demography.[19] In addition, successive Canadian governments have seen fit to cooperate with the United States out of a belief that the United States would proceed with defence projects it saw as essential to its own security regardless of Canadian support and concurrence. Better to cooperate than alienate.

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[17] Jon B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of A Middle Power in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 8.

[18] The recent demise of the Soviet Union has substantially altered the pre-existing post war security environment. The elimination of a strict bi-polar system has allowed for a greater degree of latitude for smaller states such as Canada.

[19] McLin, op cit., p. 6.

> [I]t would have been difficult indeed to resist a project which the United States government had decided was essential for the defense of the [North America].[20]

The continuity of such a perspective, however, belies the satisfaction which most Canadians feel with such an approach. The manner in which any state chooses to react to the prevailing security environment must, nonetheless, be consistent with the resources which that state is prepared to expend in the pursuit of such a policy. If not, that allocation, from a purely military perspective, is largely wasted.[21]

The Canadian dependence on external sources for its security policy has contributed to the gulf between that policy and Canadian defence policy. Close adherence to the American conception of the international security environment has created a condition in which many of Canada's international and alliance commitments are inconsistent with Canada's relative power and abilities. The view that unique Canadian security and defence requirements are going unfulfilled are indicative of the larger inconsistencies in Canadian defence and foreign policy planning. Whatever the origins of Canadian defence and security policies, those policies must be reconciled with the actual resources which are allocated to the political aims at their root. The relationship between both policies is reciprocal with either policy dependant on the other for either political meaning or credibility.

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[20] Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), p. 81.

[21] John Gellner "Strategic Analysis in Canada" International Journal, Vol. 33, (1978), p. 493

While it is certainly true that "political priorities will...limit the possible number of military options available",[22]the relationship between those priorities and options remains objective and as such is a function of the actual resources which a state can bring to bear. The failure to reconcile priorities, options and resources could result in the loss of influence or to outright political, economic and military domination. In the Canadian context this reality is no less applicable with its relevance transcending the period under discussion.

The 1987 White Paper on Defence acknowledged this gap in speaking of "The Commitment-Capability Gap". The White Paper is forthright in stipulating,

> Even if the Canadian Forces were fully manned and had modern, state-of-the-art equipment, to fulfil existing defence

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[22] Major RAD Applegate and JR Moore, "Warfare-An Option of Difficulties: An Examination of Forms of War and the Impact of Military Culture", The Royal United Services Institute Journal (Autumn 1990) p.13.

> commitments would be a daunting challenge.[23]

The problem according to the White Paper reaches back to the mid-1960's when defence expenditures began to fall, in real terms, and the overall infrastructure of the armed forces was neglected by successive governments. The solution lies, according to the White Paper, in either "dramatically" increasing those resources allocated to defence or "[S]hrinking our undertakings to existing levels of resources."

Although the White Paper asserts that the existing gulf between Canada's political commitments and its available resources originates in the funding cuts of the mid-1960s the inability to fulfil commitments is apparent much earlier. Commenting as early as 1951 Lester B. Pearson, at this early date, had come to identify the growing gulf between Canada's actual position and power and the responsibilities it had undertaken. Canada, he asserted, while not a "great nor overseas power... has accepted heavy international responsibilities."[24] The roots of the present problems lie not in the 1960s but in the security and defence posture adopted by Canada in the immediate post-war years. Lack of consensus within the bureaucracy both in terms of appreciating the prevailing security environment and how to respond to it served largely to preclude a foreign and defence policy which could reconcile political priorities with actual resources. In addition, the subservience of defence planning and allocation to diplomatic and other political priorities resulted in confusion and disarray with regards to the direction and objectives of Canada's foreign policies. Defence officials were often left out of foreign and defence policy planning, being asked later to reconcile available resources with the new commitments. The North Atlantic Treaty was a case in point.

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[23] White Paper on Defence, Challenge and Commitment, p. 43.

[24] Lester B. Pearson, "The Development of Canadian Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXX (October, 1951), p. 17, as quoted in McLin, op cit., p. 32.

CHAPTER 3

ISSUES IN CANADIAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY

1945-1963

Introduction

The defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945 provided for an international structure significantly different from that which had existed at the outset of war. As significantly as the international structure had changed so too did Canada and Canada's place in the international community. Similarly, the impact of World War II on the fabric of Canadian society was so pervasive that few Canadian institutions emerged from the war in 1945 unchanged. The "metamorphosis"[25] which Canada underwent between 1939 and 1945 was of a character unparalleled in Canadian history. The perceptions which Canadians held of Canada, and which Canada held of the world, were completely and utterly discarded and replaced by a new perception.

Prior to 1939 Canada had largely been concerned with its own economic development and the multitude of other domestic problems which it was facing. The conduct of the

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[25] Pearson, Mike Vol. II, op cit., pp.25-31.

Dominion's international affairs was left largely to Great Britain as the leader of the Commonwealth. With the "Fireproof House" intact Canada could enjoy the luxury of isolationism. For some, talk of an independent Canadian foreign policy was considered seditious. The comfort which Canadians and Canadian policy-makers felt towards Canada's role and place in international affairs was inexorably altered by the events of September 1939.

The intense effort which Great Britain had expended during World War II in the defeat of Germany largely removed Great Britain and the British empire from its' previously preeminent position in global affairs. For Canada, the concept of the "Fireproof House" was quickly becoming invalid. Technological advances combined with the realization that avoidance of global affairs had failed twice in Canada's short history to keep Canada out of war prompted Canada to review its' role in international politics. Additionally, Canada as a nation-state emerged from war in 1945, in almost every facet of national life, changed dramatically. Canada had, over the course of the war, acquired economic vitality, national purpose and identity and had come to stand as an independent international player. The Canadian military swelled until at the end of the war it was one of the strongest in the world. Canada's newly acquired economic vitality and relative military stature served to increase dramatically Canadian influence within the international community. Such influence, compounded by the reduction of European influence, brought about by the destruction of World War II, placed Canada in an historically unique position. This unique position afforded Canada a whole range of opportunities and demands which it did not have to confront prior to World War II.

Fearful of finding itself embroiled in another global conflict and dismissing those policy choices which had kept Canada out of international affairs, Canada sought positively to influence the conduct of international relations. Consciously, Canadian policy-makers dismissed isolationism and its avoidance of international politics as ineffectual and archaic. The stark evidence of two world wars was enough for most to determine the flaws in the isolationist strategy. If Canada was to avoid war in the future then war must be prevented from occurring. Canada would, Canadian policy-makers asserted, take an active role in international relations with the principal intention being the avoidance of global conflicts which would, despite Canada's isolation, come to involve Canada. Pragmatism and self-interest mixed with idealism to produce Canada's internationalist posture. Concepts such as internationalism emerged alongside functionalism and collective defence. In addition Canadian policy-makers enjoyed the relative position which Canada had come to occupy. Canada had become a mature international player, a far cry from the imperial appendage of a few short years earlier.

The following chapter will examine some of the key issues in Canadian defence and security policy in the immediate post war years. These issues include the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the integration of continental air defence efforts with the United States, the signing of the North American Air Defence Agreement, the cancellation of the AVRO Arrow, operation Skyhawk, and finally the nuclear weapons acquisition debate. Each of the above will be examined based on the following two hypotheses:

a. a lack of consensus regarding the prevailing international security environment existed within the Canadian bureaucracy. Specifically the Departments of External Affairs and Defense exhibited competing and conflicting appreciations. The result was a divergence in goals and policy objectives and;

b. the resources allocated to the attainment of defence policy objectives were inconsistent with the stated objectives of defence policy. The result was a gulf between commitments and capabilities.

The two hypotheses, as stated, are linked and related in that each attempts to determine that defence and security policy, in the era under examination, suffered from the lack of a concerted and coherent foundation. The lack of concert and coherence is found largely among, but not exclusively limited to, the bureaucratic policy formulating elites within the Departments of External Affairs and Defence.

SECTION I

The North Atlantic Treaty

Even before World War II was over Canada sought to play an extremely active role in the founding of the United Nations. From the outset the United Nations, and the precepts on which it was based, came to form the core of the Canadian internationalist vision. Even after the United Nations as an institution had failed to be the body which Canadian policy makers had hoped, faith in the concept and faith in the correctness of the multilateral approach did not subside. Support for the United Nations represented, as Lester B. Pearson related in his memoirs, "a prayerful and undemanding expression of our idealism and our hopes, a kind of satisfying ritual like the automatic repetition of the Lord's Prayer."[26]

The Canadian faith in multilateralism was nearly messianic. Canadian security policy, likewise, was an adjunct of the multilateralist ethos. For the framers of post-war Canadian policy, peace and stability could occur only as a result of disputes being settled in the multilateral forum of the United Nations, and deterrence of aggression would be achieved collectively as nations united in the common response to those who threatened the integrity of the international system. Canadian defence planning refused even to consider a situation or a set of conditions in which Canada would take unilateral action with regards to threats to its own security or the security of other nations.[27] The security and defence of Canada was intimately entwined with the concept of collective action as outlined in the United Nations Charter.[28]

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[26] Ibid., p. 134.

Canada additionally sought to enhance collective defence and security through the reinforcement of existing ties between Canada, Great Britain and the United States. The Canadian attempt to solidify defence and other ties between Great Britain and the United States was firmly rooted in the internationalist desire to entwine the interests of states and to prevent destabilizing and dangerous unilateral action. Canada had come, following the end of war in 1945, increasingly to view unrestrained expressions of American military power as a threat to international security. Given the American ability to act largely unilaterally in international affairs, it was believed that the United States might undertake policies which appeared so threatening to the Soviet Union that a war could result. The entwining of interests would draw other nations into the American decision making process thereby placing limitations on its unilateral expression.

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[27] McLin, op cit., p. 9.

[28] Ibid.

> We agreed that there was a danger that the United States might press the Soviet Union too hard and too fast, and not leave the Soviet Union a way out to save its face... To lessen this danger the Western powers will have to exert a steady and constructive influence on Washington. The establishment of a North Atlantic union will give them additional channels through which to exercise this moderating influence.[29]

Institutionalization of such a restraining method could, in this view, only be realized via collective security organizations such as the United Nations. The failure or paralysis of the United Nations, however, obviated that institution as a credible option. In light of the failure of the United Nations a new organization was sought and to avoid the deadlock of the United Nations it was determined that, the new body would consist of "like minded" states with similar interests. Attempts to respond to Canadian, British and American interests easily fit into the multilateral internationalism which Canada so unequivocally adopted.

As the Cold War intensified and the United Nations became increasingly paralysed, the convergence of Western

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[29] Escott Reid, "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, 1948-1949", in J.L. Granatstein ed., Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Readings (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1986), p. 166.

European and North American interests grew steadily. The intransigence of the Soviet Union and the deterioration of east-west relations forced Canada to reassess the viability of the United Nations as the formal and practical expression of internationalism. The result of such a reassessment was the desire to construct a new organization which could provide the level of security required, and would be free of the paralysis which affected the United Nations yet still capable of moderating the potentially irresponsibly and dangerous use of American power. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was to be the security organization which the United Nations had failed to be, an organization which Escott Reid asserted would have "teeth".[30]

As early as 1947 Canada had begun to search for an alternative to the United Nations. The importance of this search grew dramatically as the Cold War threatened to erupt into another global conflict. The clearly belligerent nature of the Soviet Union and, the coup in Czechoslovakia, further intensified Canadian desires to erect an alternative to the United Nations. It was this fear of the Soviet Union acquiring hegemony in Europe that provided most of the energy behind the drive to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

> Western leaders became afraid in the first three months of 1948 that the

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[30] Lester B. Pearson, Mike, op cit., p. 41.

> pattern of the Soviet Union's takeover of countries east of the ceasefire line would be reproduced west of the line, especially in countries such as Italy and France where the communist parties were strong and subservient instruments of the Soviet government.[31]

While Canada had concerns about the United States blundering into war, it was fear of Soviet domination of Western Europe which provided the majority of the motivating factors. Viewed as part of our contemporary understanding this fear may be difficult to comprehend. For many policy-makers in many Western capitals, however, war appeared to be imminent, indeed perhaps in 1948 only a few days away. The Norwegian government, for example, feared that at any moment the Soviet Union would make demands which would reduce Norway to the level of a satellite.[32]

Canadian attempts to erect an institution capable of performing those functions which the United Nations now seemed incapable of performing, became increasingly defence oriented as East-West relations deteriorated. While Canada did seek a substitute or surrogate United Nations organization the practical realities of defence rose to the fore in light of events of the last few years of the 1940s.[33]From the start Canada did seek to round out NATO, nevertheless, NATO was fostered and emerged in response to a specific stimulus. As such the *raison d'^etre* for NATO was from the start, and remained throughout the Cold War, collective defence. As early as 1947 Escott Reid clearly stated the contemporary Canadian understanding of the requirement for the North Atlantic Treaty,

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[31] Ibid., pp. 159-160.

[32] Escott Reid, "Forming the North Atlantic Alliance: 1949", in John Munton and John Kirton, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy Selected Cases, (Scarborough Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1992), p. 30.

> each member state could accept a binding obligation to pool the whole of its economic and military resources with those of the other members if any power should be found to have committed aggression against any one of its members.[34]

Although the impetus behind the Canadian drive to establish the NATO was firmly rooted in the requirement to effect collective defence other policy goals added additional impetus.As mentioned previously, Canadian policy-makers sought a closer alignment of Western nations, specifically the United States and Great Britain, in order to perpetuate Canadian wartime influence and to structurally restrain the arbitrary use of American power. Both easily complemented each other in that Canada was brought into the Western decision making circle and could exert influence at its nexus, the United States. Likewise, this was so for other Western states.

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[33] These events included the Czechoslovakian coup, Soviet disregard for basic human rights, Soviet atrocities in occupied countries, failure to disarm and general Soviet bellicosity and aggressive overtures among others.

[34] Escott Reid as quoted in, Pearson, Mike, Vol II, op cit., p.42.

For those who advocated a policy of aligning Western nations in a North Atlantic Treaty the benefits were clear. The idealistic underpinnings of Canadian foreign policy were satisfied in that a structure philosophically akin to the United Nations was created and was consistent with United Nations principles. The very real defence requirements were also satisfied, based on the treaty's provision for collective defence. Additionally both Canadian influence and restraints on American power were achieved by drawing the United States into a formal policy making organization; NATO would be the counterweight to the uneven balance within the Canadian-American bilateral relationship.

> The alliance would provide for Canada a countervailing force against the United States; the alliance would call in Britain and Western Europe to restore the balance in North America.[35]

The fear of virtual American hegemony frightened Canadian policy-makers not only with regards to the rash use of power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union but also in direct relation to Canada in North America. Many Canadian officials genuinely feared the impact which the newly emerged American colossus would have on Canada in the North American context. The physical proximity of the United States and the enticements which American culture held and holds, continue to serve as a definitive element in Canadian external relations. With the exhaustion of Great Britain, in the effort to defeat Germany, the trans-Atlantic counterweight to American power in North America was removed. Lester B. Pearson recounts in his memoirs,

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[35] Escott Reid, "Forming the Atlantic Alliance", op cit., p. 38.

> It (NATO) helped us to escape the
>
> dangers of a too exclusively continental relationship with our neighbour... It permitted us to establish a balance between our continental and our wider British Commonwealth, French and other connections.[36]

Canadian interest in an alternative to the United Nations sought also to "couple" American and British policies in Europe and elsewhere. The institutionalization of decision making amongst Western nations was viewed by Canada as the means of accomplishing this.[37] The long-standing Canadian goal of closer British-American relations was becoming realized. Canada no longer would be pulled in opposite directions or forced to reconcile the policy objectives of the British Empire with those of the United States.

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[36] Ibid., p.33

[37] Jon B. McLin, op cit., p.31.

> NATO was a satisfying instrument for Canadian foreign policy because it institutionalized the fundamental requirement of that policy, namely the alignment of U.S. and U.K. policies in the North Atlantic area.[38]

Reconciliation meant focus and a pooling of resources for common goals. The previously uncomfortable foreign policy position of being stuck between Great Britain and the United States and the irritations which that position had provided for most of Canada's post-Confederation history would be removed.

While issues of high politics were at the core of Canada's involvement in the founding of NATO idealism was consistently a factor in Canadian decision making. Canada sought in the NATO an organization which could perform some of the functions which Canada had envisioned the United Nations as performing. This is indicative in that Canada sought to include, in the text of the treaty, formalized commitments to closer economic, cultural and diplomatic ties. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, included almost exclusively at the behest of Canada, represented the Canadian desire for the North Atlantic Treaty to be more than a defence arrangement. The inclusion of Article 2 represented a victory for the Canadian internationalist ideology.[39]Not only did Article Two's inclusion satisfy Canadian internationalism and Atlanticism but it, as the text demonstrates, displayed the extent to which Canada had become frustrated by the paralysis of the United Nations.

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[38] Ibid.

For Canada NATO was successful in answering the basic needs of defence and assuaging Canadian idealistic longings. From the outset, however, the success of NATO as an instrument in the perpetuation of Canadian influence and in meeting the more idealistic objectives, is decidedly less clear. The institutionalization of decision making within a multilateral forum did not, despite Canadian desires, automatically translate into influence for the smaller powers. While Canada and other lesser powers may have feared the arbitrary use of American power it is not readily apparent to what extent the North Atlantic Treaty served to restrain the use of that power. It is equally plausible that American policy-makers simply grew into their new role and acquired the necessary outlook apart from the input of the other Western Allies. Similarly it is difficult to determine to what extent Canada was able to influence the United States or other allies based on its membership in NATO.[40]

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[39] Article 2 stipulated that,

> The parties will contribute to the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations... They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. They will make every effort to bring about a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization.

as quoted in Pearson, Mike, Vol II, op cit., p. 61.

Despite the idealistic rhetoric of the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 2, NATO, from its inception, was a collective defence arrangement. The currency of influence within the alliance was, and remains, measured in the resources which any particular member allocated to defence. More specifically, influence came to be measured in, in that Western Europe stood as the front-line, the military resources dedicated to alliance defence efforts on the European continent. From the Canadian perspective, the degeneration of NATO into a simple collective defence arrangement represented a dashing of the hopes which Canada had for the North Atlantic Treaty. The hope for closer economic, cultural and political integration was lost in the rapid rearmament of the early 1950's. The rapid militarization of NATO meant that for Canada to maintain the influence which it had emerged from World War II with, it would be necessary to increase the level of its military contribution to the alliance.

It is at this juncture that it becomes increasingly apparent throughout the negotiation and evolution of NATO little if any input had been provided by Canadian military planners. The rapid demobilization of the Canadian military after World War II had served to deny credible professional military advice as Canada forged its post-war alliances. The framers of post-war Canadian defence and security policy came largely from within the Department of External Affairs. The factors motivating Canadian interest in NATO have been discussed but it is apparent that a military appreciation of the Treaty and what it implied was lacking. Commitments were acquired by Canadian negotiators which Canada had no real capability of fulfilling.[41] While token resources were allocated, Canadian influence began to evaporate as it became apparent that those resources were in fact token.

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[40] See Pearson, Mike, Vol II.

Canadian policy-makers were slow, however, to comprehend the importance of concrete and substantial contributions to the alliance defence efforts in Europe. Indeed, while such contributions became the currency of influence within the Western group of nations, Canada failed to increase its defence effort. The inability to link the military imperative with influence among Western nations, in part brought about the defence and security policy crisis of the late 1950's.

In January 1951 the Canadian government conveyed the intention to dispatch Canadian troops to Europe. The events of the Korean War and the bellicosity of the Soviet Union finally led to the Canadian decision. In dispatching the Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) the Government of Canada asserted that the duration of the Canadian stay would only be as long as Europe was unable to defend itself. This assumption, as is obvious, proved to be erroneous.

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[41] James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 275-318.

The reconstruction and rearmament of Western Europe did not presage the return of the Canadian Forces from Europe. The recovery of Europe did, however, serve to expose the false assumptions on which Canadian foreign and defence policy was based. In the North Atlantic Treaty Canada sought three principal policy objectives: First, that NATO be a replacement for the United Nations in terms of multilateralism and the deterrence of aggression through collective action; second, Canada sought to restrain the arbitrary use of American power through the principal of institutionalized decision making and; third, Canada through the North Atlantic Treaty would obtain the means by which its wartime influence could extend into the post-war period. Canadian policy-makers falsely believed that merely belonging to the decision making organization would translate into influence. The classic elements of power such as military power were ignored or thought to be irrelevant in the new age.

The success of Canadian policy with regards to the North Atlantic Treaty was only marginal. While the North Atlantic Treaty did serve to deter Soviet aggression it was unable either to provide for the perpetuation of Canadian influence nor did it become the surrogate United Nations which Canadian policy-makers had hoped. The dispatch of Canadian troops to Europe and the subsequent forty-year stay demonstrated both the military nature of the alliance and the degree to which military contributions had become the currency of influence. The slow Canadian grasp of the importance of the military imperative and the subsequent lack of increases to the defence effort combined to create a situation of diminishing Canadian influence. The waning of Canadian influence served, along with other issues, to create a defence, foreign and security policy largely in disarray by the end of the 1950's.

SECTION II

Canada and Continental Defence

In many ways those events and circumstances which brought Canada into the North Atlantic Treaty also served to bring about close Canadian-American cooperation in terms of North American defence. The desire to extend Canadian-American wartime defence cooperation into the post-war period had received support even prior to the end of war in 1945. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) was the conduit through which the United States requested,

> conversations to provide, in light of changed world conditions, a continuing basis for joint action of the military forces of Canada and the United States in order to ensure the security of Alaska, Canada, Labrador, Newfoundland, and the northern portions of the United States.[42]

The onset of the Cold War and the demonstration of a Soviet strategic weapons capability heightened dramatically the perception that North America was vulnerable to attack.[43] Military planners and policy-makers both in Washington and Ottawa determined that in order to render a plausible defence of North America, close co-operation between the Canadian military and its American counterpart was required.[44] With the possibility of a land attack against continental North America negligible, the primary emphasis of continental defence was the defence against possible air attack.

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[42] Eayrs, op cit., p. 336.

[43] Cuthbertson, op cit., p. 31.

The integration of continental defence remains a highly politicized and sensitive issue both internal to Canada and with regards to the Canadian-American relationship[45]. Few issues in Canadian history have had such a significant impact on either Canadian foreign or domestic politics as the integration of Canadian-American defence efforts in North America. Events such as the cancellation of the AVRO Arrow, Operation Skyhawk, the signing of NORAD and finally the fall of a sitting government all had their origins in the controversy surrounding the integration of continental defence with the United States.

The importance of the events and issues cited above also serve to expose many of the underlying notions and perceptions, as will be explored, which together provided for Canadian defence and security policy then; in many ways such notions and perceptions have carried over into the present period. The events surrounding the move to integrate continental defence planning expose the manner in which defence and security policy issues are decided upon. In this way the mechanism of policy-making both formal and informal is more readily observable.

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[44] Memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee, "Continental Air Defence - Foreign Policy Implications," National Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs Files RG-12, 11-58, August 14, 1958.

[45] Research conducted at the National Archives in Ottawa demonstrated that large numbers of documents relating to continental defence integration remain classified some forty to fifty years later. In a number of cases even requests for disclosure under the Access to Information Act were denied.

The present section will examine the reasons why both Canadians and Americans sought closer defence ties following World War II and examine the impact of such closer ties. The historical depiction will be followed by a discussion of the competing policy visions which were evident within the departments of Defence and External Affairs. A thorough discussion of continental defence efforts is relevant to the study at hand in that the importance of political issues versus capabilities is again apparent. While the Department of National Defence and its' professional officers had a guiding role, the political objections or issues raised by the Department of External Affairs consistently mitigated the purist military rationale and objectives. Increasingly, during the debate over the nature and type of continental defence integration, the divergence of appreciations emerging from the respective departments becomes obvious. The importance of political considerations, the lack of a bureaucratic consensus and once again the gulf which came to exist between commitments and capabilities are all apparent.

In 1946 the PJBD,[46] in a memorandum entitled, "General Principles", advocated the continuation of Canadian-American wartime defence co-operation. The memorandum called for the creation of, the "Canada-United States of America Chiefs of Staff" or CANUSA committee which would serve to implement a post-war security plan. Additionally, CANUSA would be mandated to "establish joint Canada-United States command for local operations".[47] Although American military planners were initially cool to the idea and Canadian diplomats fearful of closer ties with the United States and its impact on Canada's Commonwealth connection,[48] military officials began meeting in May 1946. The assessments and predictions which arose out of those first meetings were prophetic. Styling themselves as the Canadian-United States

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[46] The Permanent Joint Board on Defence was created as a result of the Ogdensburg Agreement in 1940. The function of the PJBD was one of resolving differences between Canada and the United States with regards to continental defence and coordinating continental defence efforts.

[47] Jockel, op cit., p. 15.

[48] The American Joint Chiefs of Staff were not enthusiastic based on the prospect of having to share future war planning with the Canadians. The Joint Chiefs wanted to avoid any situation where American war plans would be formulated in conjunction with Allies' Chiefs of Staff. For the Canadians the concluding of a formal alliance with the United States may send the wrong message to Great Britain and the other Commonwealth countries. See Ibid., p. 17.

Military Co-operation Committee, the officials asserted that not only would North America be vulnerable to attack in the near future but that such an attack could come in the form of aircraft, missiles or submarines launching missiles.[49] The committee further forecast that Soviet attempts to construct a nuclear weapon would come to fruition in three to five years: an estimate that defied most experts' thinking but which nevertheless proved correct.[50]

The appearance, in 1947, at the May Day parade in Moscow, of the Soviet Tu-4 long range bomber served significantly to alter attitudes pertaining to the necessity of continental defence integration and planning and the pace of such integration. The demonstration of a Soviet long range bomber capability, years before reasonable estimates, injected an air of near panic into the pace of continental defence integration.[51] Few remained unconvinced of the necessity of integrating North American defence planning. Within twelve months Canada activated two air defence fighter squadrons and laid plans for the construction of the CF-100 and the purchase of 56 F-86 jet fighters.[52]

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[49] Cuthbertson, op cit., pp. 22-23.

[50] Jockel, op cit., p.30.

[51] Ibid., p.31.

[52] Ibid., p. 40.

The construction of air-defence radar was undertaken in conjunction with the acquisition of interceptor aircraft. The United States exerted considerable pressure in this area as the requirement to detect Soviet aircraft as far north as possible would increase American reaction time.[53] The largely American Pinetree Line was extended north into Canada in 1951 and was followed shortly thereafter by the Mid-Canada Line or McGill Fence. The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, the most well known and extensive of the post-war radar systems, was initiated in 1954.

Early in the process of integration the American military establishment voiced concern. Such concern was based on sensitivities over the sharing of defence planning of the continental United States with Canada and inter-service rivalry over budget allocations. In Canada, the Canadian military also had cause for caution as the American perception of the Soviet threat was in part discounted by military authorities.[54] In a report tabled in 1954, however, by the Joint Planning Committee to the Chiefs of Staff Committee entitled "United States Defence Policy and the Possible Implications for Canadian Defence Policy", Canadian defence planners forecast that "further integration of the air-defence of Canada and the United States" would occur and that an "increase in the air defence forces of Canada including fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft and guided missile forces" would be undertaken. Additionally, the committee forecast "a further increase in Canada's participation in United States defence projects in Canada".[55]Despite its early hesitancy, the American military establishment quickly and strongly, came to endorse the concept of Canadian-American continental defence cooperation. Such endorsement originated largely from the United States Air Force (USAF) which, in expanding its commitments and role, looked for larger budget allocations.

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[53] It was acknowledged in Canada that the air defence of North America was vital to overall Western security in that the Western nuclear deterrent was largely American.

> Its (North America's) defence, is of vital importance to NATO as a whole, particularly because the main deterrent strength of the free world is provided from North America.

Memorandum, Jules Leger to General C. Foulkes, "NORAD - Terms of Reference", December 11, 1957, National Archives Canada, Files of the Chief of Defence Staff, RG-12 (f).

Although both the Canadian and American military leadership endorsed continental defence integration, the reasons underscoring such support differed. In the case of the United States military hierarchy, both uniformed and civilian, it was generally perceived that it was necessary to secure at least Canadian acquiescence, based on the need to close "the ¡radar¿ gap between Alaska and Greenland".[56]

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[54] Cuthbertson, op cit., p. 25.

[55] Memorandum by the Joint Planning Committee to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, "United States Defence Policy and the Possible Implications for Canadian Defence Policy", 15 June 1954. National Archives Canada, Cabinet Defence Committee File, RG-12, 11-58.

> the planning and application of joint defence measures remains the most active of our current relations with Canada. Our military authorities are naturally insistent on closing the gap between Alaska and Greenland.[57]

Military planners, particularly within the newly independent USAF, determined that the United States was vulnerable to air attack and that if such an attack utilized nuclear weapons the United States would be unable to effect either military or economic mobilization and would therefore be unable to render a defence of Western Europe.[58]The explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949, considerably ahead of most predictions, dramatically heightened the stakes and convinced most that the comprehensive air-defence of North America was a necessity on an immediate basis.[59]

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[56] Memorandum Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, October 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. 5 (Washington: USGPO, 1969), 55. As quoted in Jockel, op cit., p. 22.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., p.35.

[59] The United States informed Canada in 1948 that a (continued...)

With the Soviet Union in possession of the atomic bomb and a long range bomber capability the United States undertook to expand the USAF and to construct long range radar facilities as a means of detecting incoming Soviet aircraft. The perceived vulnerability of North America and the belligerence of the Soviet Union combined dramatically to heighten the perceived requirement for the air-defence of North America.[60] To be effective such a defence, for the United States, required radar installations as far north as possible, this meant within Canada if adequate reaction time, allowing for the USAF to launch the retaliatory nuclear bombers, was to be provided.[61] Further, the destruction of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons over relatively unpopulated regions of Canada rather than over highly populated regions in the United States, was particularly attractive for American planners. Officials within the American Department of Defence and within the State Department had no reason to believe that the Canadians

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[59] (...continued) surprise attack on North America by Soviet bombers utilizing nuclear weapons (which they believed by 1954 they would have some 150) would be so destructive that the war would be lost. Eayrs, op cit., p. 390.

[60] Harry S. Truman, speech regarding American policy in an enlarged Korean War, April 11, 1951. As quoted in Thomas G. Patterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 1914, second edition (Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984), pp. 434-438.

[61] see note 12. See also Cuthbertson, op cit., p. 39.

would be anything less than cooperative and helpful. Indeed the PJBD and officials within the Canadian military were enthusiastic, perhaps even more so than their American counterparts.[62]

For Canada continental air-defence integration meant more than just rendering a plausible defence of North America against the Soviet manned bomber threat. For the Canadian military and in particular the RCAF it meant inclusion within the American military planning and decision making umbrella. In detail the Canadian Air Force would acquire access to intelligence information, high technology, input into decision making at the highest levels and an increased, if not preeminent position, within the ranking of the services in Canada. In dollars and resources this meant greater numbers of personnel, aircraft, bases and a greater share of the limited defence dollar.

> The Korean War, in 1951, launched Canada on a massive rearmament programme with expenditures of $5 billion over a three-year period. Initially, all three services benefited but it soon became clear that air defence expenditures were going to take increasing amounts of a declining defence budget after 1954.[63]

The alarms which were being sounded in the United States regarding the vulnerability of North America were also being sounded in Canada.[64] If North America and the United States were vulnerable to Soviet air attack so to was Canada. The same levels of concern which were emanating from the Pentagon and the White House were also, by the end of the 1940's being heard within the Canadian military and the Canadian government[65]. The demobilization of the Canadian military, undertaken after World War II, was halted and rearmament was undertaken as the events of the Korean war convinced Canadian decision makers that the Soviet regime was both aggressive and determined to effect political and territorial gains through the use of military force.[66] The vulnerability of Canada and the lack of any Canadian ability either to detect an incoming attack or engage it are becoming, by 1950, an issue of substantial political and military importance.[67]

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[62] Jockel, op cit., p. 100.

[63] Cuthbertson, op cit., p. 43.

By 1950 several initiatives were undertaken by Canada to address the air defence problem. These included acquisition of modern jet fighter/interceptor aircraft from both Great Britain and the United States, development and testing of the *CF-100*, activation of, by 1951, nine squadrons of air defence aircraft, creation of the Canadian Air Defence Command and the laying of plans for the *CF-105 Arrow*. It was observed, however, that the acquisition of fighter/interceptor aircraft would be meaningless unless adequate radar facilities were also built.[68] The cost, complexity and the requirement to overlap radar coverage with the American system produced different sets of problems than had emerged with regards to fighter aircraft. From the outset it was generally accepted by Canadian defence planners that Canada could not bear the cost of adequate radar coverage alone and to do so was neither militarily nor fiscally sound.[69]Some type of joint effort, it was apparent, would be required.

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[64] see note 30.

[65] Cuthbertson, op cit., pp. 29-30.

[66] Jockel, op cit., p.41.

[67] Jockel, op cit., p. 43.

> An important element in the air defense of North America is that it be a single system and not a combination of two or more systems... The United States has recognized the limitations of Canadian ability to provide complete defence and they have also recognized that anything we do lessens the efforts that they have to make for the defence of the United States.[70]

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[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid., p. 45.

[70] Memorandum, Air Marshall F.R, Miller, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Douglas Harkness, Minister of National Defence, "The Air Defence Problem", 22 December, 1960. National Archives Canada, Department of National Defence Files RG-12, 964-6-3.

See also, Charles Foulkes, "Canadian Defence Policy in the Nuclear Age, Behind the Headlines, XXI, No. 1 (Canadian

Thus the impetus behind and rationale for close Canadian-American cooperation in the air defence of North America was born. American defence planners agreed with their Canadian counterparts, albeit for slightly different reasons, that a Canadian ability to provide for the early detection and warning of incoming Soviet aircraft was necessary. Such a capability would complement and supplement the American radar network and would provide earlier warning, enabling American strategic bombers to become airborne. The concentration of population both Canadian and American around the Great Lakes also prompted the United States to begin considering the issue of radar coverage as an area of bilateral rather than unilateral concern. American radar along the American north-eastern border could not provide the required level of coverage or the required warning time to effect adequate defensive precautions. The commander of the American Air Defence Command commented that,

> in my opinion our highly industrialized, highly populated border - which is wide open and will continue to be so until we extend our present programmed radars northward.[71]

Institute of International Affairs, May 1961), p. 2.

[71] Whitehead to USAFHQ, 5 January 1950, Jockel, op cit., p. 43.

Canadian military planners and government officials agreed.[72] By the summer of 1950 the Canadian and American air forces were drawing plans which would see the costs, construction and manning of radar installations in Canada as a joint effort. In April 1951 construction on the Canadian portions of the Pinetree line commenced. Almost immediately plans were laid for a more comprehensive radar network and the extension of radar coverage farther north. Work on the McGill Fence and the DEW Line commenced almost immediately, with actual construction of the DEW Line beginning in 1954.

Despite the military soundness of integrated efforts to solve the immense air defence problem of North America and the general acceptance of the belief that the Soviet Union represented a threat to Canada, not all Canadian policy-makers were enthusiastic about the close cooperation of the respective countries' militaries. Concerns could be heard emanating from those of the nationalist perspective at both ends of the political spectrum and from within the Department of External Affairs.[73] The nationalists voiced concern over the intrusive nature of previous Canadian-

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[72] Ibid., pp. 44-45.

[73] Concerns of a military nature were also be heard most notably from Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, see Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, "Costly Folly of Our Defense Policy", Macleans, (February 18, 1956), and Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, "Where We Have Gone Wrong on Defence Policy", Macleans, (June 23, 1956).

American joint defence efforts with regards to the northern and largely uninhabited regions of Canada. Such concerns dated back to World War II and the establishment of American military facilities in the Canadian north.[74]

> The Americans have apparently walked in and taken possession in many cases as if Canada were unclaimed territory inhabited by a docile race of aborigines.[75]

Canadian nationalist concerns, recurrent in post-war Canadian-American relations, centred on the fear that Canada and Canadian interests would become subsumed by American interests with a corresponding loss of Canadian sovereignty and the ability of Canada to pursue distinct Canadian interests.[76] The fears of the Canadian nationalists were further exacerbated by the virtual removal of the British Commonwealth connection as a counterweight to the United States in continental affairs. Canada, it was perceived, stood largely alone in North America facing the preponderance of American power and influence. Strict safeguards and due adherence to the potential for American interests to subsume Canadian interests should, in the nationalist view, be maintained, even at great economic and perhaps political cost.[77]

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[74] Jon B. Mclin, op cit., p. 12.

[75] Vincent Massey, What's Past is Prologue: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Vincent Massey (Toronto: Macmillian of Canada, 1963), pp. 371-372.

[76] Jockel, op cit., p. 48.

The realities of the post-war security environment and the costs which technological advances brought, eventually, but not completely, forced the chauvinistic concerns of the Canadian nationalists to the backburner.

> If Canada does not wish to exercise the choice of refusing further expenditures of a major nature on defence against the manned bomber threat, it would seem to have two possible alternatives. One may be some increase in Canada's defence budget. The other alternative may be to accept a greater degree of United States assistance.[78]

The threat posed by the Soviet Union coupled with the Soviet development of long range bombers and a nuclear capability along with the clear belligerence of the Soviet regime forced even the most ardent of nationalists to compromise their principles. While the United States may represent a more chronic problem, for Canadians the security environment of the late 1940's and early 1950's was acute. If the Soviet Union had sought, in the initial years of the 1950's, to strike North American targets utilizing atomic weapons it could have done so largely without having to face a credible air-defence over North America.[79] The destruction wrought by such an attack, even if only partly successful, could have significantly altered the balance of power and presented the opportunity for the Soviet Union to acquire additional territory in Western Europe. While such statements today may seem outlandish, within the context of the period it is precisely this scenario which Western defence planners feared most.[80]

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[77] George Grant, Lament for a Nation, (Toronto: MacMillian Publishers, 1965), p. 40.

[78] Memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee, "Continental Air Defence - Foreign Policy Implications", op cit., p. 2.

The fears surrounding Canadian nationalism and sovereignty were swept aside in the near panic associated with the need to construct adequate continental air-defence forces and early warning installations. For many of the same reasons as had appeared at the height of the Second World War so in the initial years of the Cold War nationalist concerns were forced aside. In short sovereignty, in part, was traded for defence and the requirement to allocate a large percentage of the Gross National Product to defence requirements.

> Canada, and every other nation in the Western Alliance, accepted a diminution of sovereignty when it entered into commitments designed to provide collective security for a group of like-minded nations in NATO. Canada took a further step along the same path when it entered into the NORAD agreement with the United States. Perhaps an even more

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[79] Cuthbertson, op cit., p. 31.

[80] See note 8.

> fundamental consideration, however, than these is the realization that Canada cannot of its own resources defend itself adequately against an attack by a major power.[81]

Despite the practical requirement to erect a comprehensive air-defence of North America the Canadian government did insist that no undue infringements of Canadian sovereignty had occurred. Conditions such as the retention of land titles, ascendancy of Canadian law and the right to assume unilaterally all operations, were imposed.[82] In many ways the American adherence to such Canadian conditions amounted to American support of Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, something which the United States had and continues to have great reluctance in doing.[83]As with Canada, so too the United States set aside certain policy aims in the situation of near panic which prevailed during the first few years of the Cold War.

Within the Canadian government concerns were also being voiced. These concerns emanated largely from the Department of External Affairs and covered a wide range of issues. First among these, appearing as early as 1946 and prevalent throughout most of the post-war period, was the sensitivity on the behalf of the Department of External Affairs to the too intimate contact between the uniformed portions of the Department of National Defence and other countries armed forces, particularly and in the case of continental defence to the American military. This concern was realized in two ways: first, that negotiation between the various arms of the Canadian military and other allied countries military establishments could be construed by the allied country as official Canadian policy. In 1946 the formality of the discussions between the Canadian and the American military alarmed some in the Department of External Affairs prompting Lester B. Pearson to comment to then Acting American Secretary of State Dean Acheson that perhaps members of the PJBD perceived themselves as a policy making body. Pearson remarked that he,

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[81] see note 78.

[82] Cuthbertson, op cit., pp. 34-35.

[83] R.J. Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic," in R. St. J. Macdonald, The Arctic Frontier (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), p. 271.

> sometimes wondered whether the Joint Defence Board might not develop a tendency, on occasion, to become a determining instrument of high policy. In addition I thought it was sometimes a little difficult to keep track of all the activities of the Board because of the fact that some of its communications pass between the two secretaries while others pass direct from General Henry to the Canadian service authorities.[84]

Secondly, the career diplomats within the Department of

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[84] Pearson to Robertson, 21 June 1946, Department of External Affairs Files 52-C. As quoted in Jockel, op cit., p. 25.

External Affairs were sensitive to the discussions and planning which took place within the military hierarchy to the exclusion of either the various countries diplomats or indeed the various countries elected authorities.

Throughout the period the Department of External Affairs consistently attempted to limit or restrict military-to-military contacts and urged that negotiations be brought to the diplomatic level. When in 1946 the PJBD recommended close defence cooperation be extended into the post-war period then Canadian Ambassador Lester B. Pearson grated at the Board's formal pronouncements and others in the Department of External Affairs expressed similar concerns.[85]Likewise officials within the Department of External Affairs expressed concerns over the formality of negotiations regarding extension of radar networks into Canada.

Officials within the Department of External Affairs also worried about the perceptions of Great Britain and others in the Commonwealth with regards to an intimate Canadian-American defence relationship. For many career diplomats the Commonwealth connection was extremely important.[86] Additionally, there existed the belief, within the Department of External Affairs, that Canada must and should take a leadership role within the Commonwealth. Close Canadian-American defence relations could jeopardize Canada's role within the Commonwealth by compromising the impartiality of Canada among non-western countries.[87]

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[85] Jockel, op cit., pp. 16-17.

[86] Ibid., p. 47.

Idealists within External Affairs had begun to chart a new internationalist course for Canada. Close bilateral defence relations with a superpower could impair both Canada's appearance as an impartial outward looking middle-power and, in a more universal sense, multilateralism as a whole.[88] Indeed Canada's involvement in other multilateral bodies other than the Commonwealth could similarly be impaired.

Likewise, the expansion of the Canadian military could be adversely perceived by other members of the international community. The road to stability within the international community, in the idealist perception, was neither a mere balance of power equation nor achieved via the influence which military power brought. National interests could peacefully be pursued through multilateral institutions in keeping with the principles of functionalism. Participation in dramatic rearmament or the coalescing of clearly anti-Soviet military alliances might prompt the Soviet Union to seize expansionist opportunities or attempt to preempt the

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[87] D.B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, op cit., pp. 62-63.

[88] Ibid.

United States and the other Western powers from achieving a preponderant military position. For many policy-makers within the post-war cabinets and within the Department of External Affairs, post-war Canada's international stature was rooted in its embrace of internationalism, not conventional power politics.

The drawing of Canada into a bilateral defence relationship with the United States further worried the diplomats within the Department of External Affairs in that the distinctly Canadian appreciation of the prevailing international situation or particular international events may be subsumed by the American perception. The lop-sided nature of the Canadian-American relationship, particularly in defence matters, could force exclusively Canadian interests into a secondary position.[89] American interests and the American understanding of world events could constrain Canadian freedom of action. While the United States viewed the Soviet Union as an aggressively expansionist monolith, this was not necessarily so, in the Canadian view.[90]If, however, in this view, the United States determined that a particular policy or set of policies was in the vital interests of the United States then that particular policy would prevail.

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[89] Cuthbertson, op cit., p. 81.

[90] Don Page and Don Munton, "Canadian Images of the Cold War 1946-7," International Journal 32, no. 3 (1977), p. 577.

Finally, Canadian policy-makers were wary of the appearance of receiving aid from the United States. The tremendous cost associated with a comprehensive air defence network would necessitate that a greater share be borne by the United States. The uneven nature of the cost sharing arrangements could make it appear that Canada was receiving aid from the United States. So acute was the fear that the disproportionate nature of cost sharing be perceived as American foreign aid, that following the signing of the agreement to jointly construct the Pinetree Line, Hume Wrong, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, sought public assurances that the United States did not consider the project as foreign aid.[91]

Despite the fears of the Department of External Affairs, the Department of National Defence wholeheartedly endorsed closer Canadian-American defence cooperation. With the cessation of hostilities in 1945 the Liberal Government of Mackenzie King quickly set about to slash the defence budget and largely return to pre-war levels of military preparedness. The implications of such a policy for the Canadian Armed Forces were such that by 1946 no active regular RCAF squadrons were operational. Similar cuts reduced the other armed services to a mere shadow of their wartime strength. The interest of the United States in continental defence cooperation must have appeared as the only bright spot in an otherwise dismal and bleak future for the Canadian military. It is no surprise that, with only a handful of exceptions, the leadership of the Canadian military heartily endorsed and encouraged close and intimate cooperation with the United States military. Close cooperation would mean access to American intelligence and high technology as well as inclusion in the highest level Western defence and security policy planning.

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[91] Jockel, op cit., p. 49.

Throughout the period the obstructionist manner of the Department of External Affairs, as it must have seemed, caused great frustration amongst the Canadian Joint Chiefs of Staff. For Canadian military planners the experience of World War had been one in which the military objective of the unconditional surrender of the Axis states was clearly defined. Resources were commensurate with the objective. The absence of outright war muddled the issue for the military and forced it cope with issues other than pure capabilities.

The new post-war realities in the appreciation and planning of defence and security policy were not thoroughly understood by the Canadian military. Interference by other government departments in defence issues constituted just that, interference. Such a perception served to cause bureaucratic friction and intrigue throughout the remainder of the 1940’s and into the 1950’s and 60’s. The debate and controversy surrounding the signing of the NORAD provides for perhaps the most acute example of such inter-departmental discord.

SECTION III

The Signing of the North American Air Defence Agreement

The events surrounding the signing of the NORAD agreement constitute one of the most interesting and revealing issues in the history of Canadian defence and security policy. In many ways the NORAD agreement constitutes that issue which perhaps best exemplifies the bureaucratic conflict which surrounded defence and security policy formulation during the 1950's and 1960's. The events surrounding the signing of the NORAD agreement are significant because of the manner in which the uniformed military was capable of both negotiating the treaty and having the Canadian government, and, in particular the prime minister, provide approval. Particularly evident is the effort which the military expended in excluding the Department of External Affairs for fear of allowing the treaty to undergo close diplomatic or political scrutiny. It is clear from this that a lack of consensus within the bureaucracy did exist and that it served to shape both the types of policy adopted and the manner in which they were adopted.

As early as 1953 senior military and civilian officials within the Pentagon and the USAF began to look at a single integrated command of continental air defence resources as a logical extension of the cooperation in continental defence matters which had quickly matured in the immediate post-war years.[92] The events of the Korean War and the development by the Soviet Union of a strategic long-range bomber capability provided continued impetus. One year later, in 1954, the idea had gathered considerable momentum among military officials in both Canada and the United States.

The integration of command of North American air defence resources was clearly desired by Canadian military leaders, particularly those in the RCAF.[93] Despite the obvious enthusiasm of the Canadian air force and others within the Department of National Defence, civilian members of the bureaucracy and other public officials were substantially less enthusiastic. The integration of command, effectively placing large segments of the RCAF under the command of an American officer, served once again to raise fears over the loss of Canadian freedom of action and sovereignty. The fear regarding the loss of sovereignty was heightened, based on the unwillingness of the United States to allow any linkage between continental defence efforts and NATO. For its detractors NORAD, as an exclusively bilateral arrangement, did not incorporate a mechanism whereby the preponderance of American power within the relationship could be countered or balanced. Although a real appreciation of a Soviet threat did exist, a corresponding diplomatic rationale was absent.

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[92] In 1947 agreement between Canada and the United States was reached which covered five areas of defence cooperation. These included: (1) exchange of military personnel; (2) cooperation in weapons tests and development; (3) standardization; (4) sharing of bases, and; (5) sovereign control over military activities in each others territory. See McLin, op cit., p. 11.

[93] Close integration was sought by the RCAF based on a number of factors amongst these were: access to intelligence; input in decision making; inclusion in the American military umbrella; increased funding based on greater commitment and; increased political clout vis-a-vis the other Canadian service. See previous section.

In the United States the concept of an integrated command was advocated by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Sterling Cole, who undertook to advance the idea with both American Secretary of Defence Wilson and the Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff.[94]In Canada the staunchest advocates of such an integrated command structure were high ranking officers of the RCAF and other highly placed military officials. In a report by the Joint Planning Committee of the Chiefs of Defence Staff and as indicated in the Chiefs of Defence Staff Aide Memoir of June and February 1954, the complete integration of American and Canadian air defence forces was seen logically to flow from the close ongoing cooperation.

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[94] Ibid.

The June report forecast that in the ensuing few years, "the integration of the air defence of Canada and the United States would occur" while the Aide Memoir is more frank in advocating, "the completion of the integration of Canada-U.S. air defence forces."[95]Speaking in 1955 Air Marshall Roy Slemon, Chief of the Canadian Air Staff, expressed the belief that integration of American and Canadian forces was inevitable. Slemon's comments, however, were disavowed by the Minister of National Defence, Ralph Campney. It appears at this juncture that senior military officials held a somewhat different appreciation of both the requirement for an integrated command structure and the haste with which such a structure should be effected. Slemon responded to the rejection of his comments by Campney by stipulating that he was merely expressing what the armed forces and in particular the air forces in Canada had taken for granted for a number of years.[96]Factually, Slemon's comments were correct. His comments, however, demonstrated a lack of understanding on behalf of the military hierarchy, at the highest levels, of the sensitive political considerations which typified and continue to typify the Canadian-American bilateral relationship.

As Campney's repudiation of Air Vice Marshal Slemon's remarks demonstrates, Canadian civilian authorities were substantially less enthusiastic about the prospects of an intensification of integration with the United States in defence matters. Major political obstacles existed in Canada, not the least of which was sensitivity over public perception and the strident reluctance to have any agreement with the United States appear as mutual aid. In addition, Canadian attempts to incorporate the increasing bilateral defence cooperation between the United States and Canada into the NATO framework had been strenuously rebuffed by the United States.[97]

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[95]. see note 81.

[96]. McLin, op cit., p. 39.

Consistently, throughout the post-war period, the United States, as a fundamental principle of American defence policy, has refused to allow North American defence planning to become a multilateral issue. To allow the defence of North America to become a wider multilateral or western collective defence issue would, it was perceived, limit American freedom of action. The defence of the continental United States was and remains a unilateral American matter.

> NATO, in American eyes, was for the
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> defence of Europe, not North America. As NATO developed a military command structure, the United States made sure

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[97] General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff to Jules Leger, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, "NORAD-Relationship with NATO," 3 January, 1958. National Archives Canada, Chief of Defence Staff Files RG-12, 9-58.

> that its aegis did not extend to the continental United States. The U.S. was determined to preserve exclusive national control over defence at home, especially over the Strategic Air Command.[98]

For Canadian planners, especially within the Department of External Affairs, the American unwillingness to include continental defence planning within the NATO framework, ran counter to the acceptance of multilateralism as the paramount precept of Canadian external relations. Additionally, such a tight relationship with the United States did not contain the corresponding counter-balance which Canadian policy makers had consistently sought in the post-war period.

> Beyond the contribution NATO made to basic Canadian national interests... NATO provided a framework in which Canada could try to develop further military, political and economic ties with Western European members of the alliance, offsetting to some degree Canada's asymmetrical relationship with the United States. Ottawa also took a certain amount of comfort from NATO's multilateral context in which, along with several smaller powers, it might make its voice heard more forcefully on the grand strategic matters of the day than in possible dialogue with the United States.[99]

Despite the political wariness which was growing in Canada the RCAF and other senior military officials embraced operational integration as the only correct and plausible military solution to the immense North American air defence problem.[100] Both the USAF and the RCAF had accepted the integration of North American air defence forces in a single command as militarily sound and necessary.

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[98] Jockel, op cit., p. 96.

[99] Ibid.

> The idea of combining the air defence forces had a military logic to it, particularly because both air forces saw themselves as organized and equipped to counter any Soviet bomber attack on North America. The Royal Canadian Air Force in particular believed it could only benefit from closer ties with the large, powerful and technically sophisticated U.S. Air Force.[101]

Both appreciated, however, that they had to move cautiously.[102] By 1955 both the Canadian and American air forces had agreed on the military requirement for an integrated operational command structure. The response to Air Marshall Slemon's comments in the same year convinced air force officers on both sides of the border, however, that it was politically inopportune to advance the idea at the present time. Despite the evident political sensitivities, enthusiasm for the project did not wane, and while the

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[100] McLin, op cit., p. 45.

[101] J.L. Granatstein, Canada, 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, op cit., p . 102.

[102] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Sundry Legislation affecting the Naval and Military Establishments, 84th Congress., 1st Sess, 1955 Book I, pp. 223-224, as quoted in Ibid., p. 38.

Canadian Chiefs were constrained by political exigencies at home the USAF intensified its pursuit of the plan.[103]

Some collusion has been suggested with regards to who should initiate the concept of an integrated command. The RCAF, for political reasons, saw it necessary for their American counterparts to take the lead. United States General Earl Partridge, who commanded the American Continental Air Defence and Air Force Air Defence Command, seemed to suggest this when in the fall of 1955 he stated,

> Informal information that we have just received from Canada indicates that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff have no firm plans for presenting a combined air defence proposal to the Canadian Cabinet. In fact, our informal information indicates that this is somewhat of a dead issue in Canada at this time, and that impetus for action on a combined command might have to come from the United States rather than Canada.[104]

In February 1956 the American military officials sought to advance the concept of an integrated command with Canadian military officials. The Canadian Chiefs responded anxiously but were adamant about the political sensitivity of the issue in Canada. Any negotiation on the subject would have to be kept strictly secret. The American Joint Chiefs assuaged the Canadian fears by stipulating that, "every precaution is being taken to preclude any leakage of information".[105]A committee of Canadian and American air force officers was struck to examine an integrated command. This committee released its report in December 1956 and the report was quickly agreed to by both the Canadian and American chiefs of staff.[106] In Canada, Minister of National Defence Ralph Campney approved of the plan and sent word to Washington that cabinet approval would be a formality.[107] Campney never took the agreement to either the Cabinet Defence Committee or the full Cabinet, the general election of 10 June 1956 precluded such a move and presented another obstacle. The general election prevented the Liberal Government of Louis St. Laurent from considering the proposal and after the surprising victory of the Diefenbaker Conservatives, the lameduck Cabinet refused to consider it based on the perceived lack of authority to do so.[108]Throughout the negotiations the Department of External Affairs had largely been excluded and when Prime Minister John Diefenbaker finally consented to the agreement many in External Affairs were taken by complete "surprise".[109]

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[103] J.L. Granatstein, Canada, 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, op cit., p. 103.

[104] General Earl Partridge to USAF chief of staff, 21 October 1955, reprinted in enclosure C to JCS 1541/102, 5 December 1955, "Report by the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Combined Canada-United States Air Defence Command." as quoted in Jockel, op cit., p. 100.

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[105] Ibid., p. 101.

[106] McLin, op cit., pp. 39-40.

[107] Ibid., p. 30.

Frustration was becoming apparent among the RCAF and their American colleagues as approval of the integrated command structure appeared to be becoming bogged down in domestic Canadian politics. American approval had been given by Secretary of Defence Wilson in March of 1957 and increasing concern was becoming evident in the United States. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff were sensitive to this concern and it was Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Charles Foulkes who brought pressure on the new government to give its approval. Foulkes took the plan to the incoming Minister of National Defence, George Pearkes. Pearkes recounts,

> from the moment I took over [Foulkes] pressed the urgency of getting a decision. He certainly gave me the impression that it was all tied up by the Liberal government, that promises had been made that it would be signed immediately after the election... I do know that they [the Canadian military] were under almost daily pressure from

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[108] Cabinet Conclusions, June 13, 1957, National Archives Canada, Privy Council Office Files.

[109] David Cox, "Canada and NORAD, 1958-1978: A Cautionary Retrospective", (Canadian Centre For Arms Control, n.d., n.p.).

the military in the United States.[110]

On July 24th, 1957 Foulkes went to see the Prime Minister and it is was at this meeting that Diefenbaker gave his approval to the plan as conceived by the military establishments in both Canada and the United States. The issue was not taken up with the Cabinet Defence Committee nor was it brought to the full Cabinet until the end of July. The July 31st Cabinet meeting did not consider the overall plan but rather the appointment of Air Marshall Slemon as deputy commander of the newly created NORAD. Of greater significance to the study at hand is the fact that Diefenbaker agreed to NORAD with little or no other input from other members of Cabinet. In addition Diefenbaker chose not to consult with the Department of External Affairs. Some have contended that his failure to do so was based on his belief that the Department was staffed with Liberal Party sympathizers.[111]The Department and its career diplomats were understandably displeased with this turn of events. In fact, the acting undersecretary, John Holmes, became aware of the agreement from the United States

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[110] Reprint, from J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1963: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, op cit., p. 103.

[111] McLin, op cit., p. 44. See also Jockel, op cit., p. 105.

Ambassador.[112] Sidney Smith, Diefenbaker's Secretary of State for External Affairs, later testified before the Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and asserted,

> So far as this department is concerned and I say this very emphatically, so far as this department is concerned, we have not been brought into the picture whatever. This has been a discussion on a military basis.[113]

External's objections were based on a number of points. At the outset the relationship between NORAD and NATO was questioned. External had not been intimately involved in the military negotiations and it is safe to assume legitimately did not know the answer.[114] Confusion on this point existed within the government as well. The American position on the relationship between continental defence and NATO was well known, yet for political reasons the Diefenbaker Government found it expedient to establish some type of link, however implausible.

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[112] Memorandum, Holmes to Bryce, 31 July 1957. National Archives Canada, Privy Council Office Files D-28-3 (f), as quoted in Jockel, op cit., p. 105.

[113] Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, (December 3, 1957), p. 20.

[114] While a representative of the Department of External Affairs had been present at the meetings of the Military Study Group, External had never been called upon to comment on the report of the Group. Clarification of matters in the report which External would have found sensitive was never undertaken. Agreement by Diefenbaker without consulting External forced the Department to play "catch-up". A role which in light of its prominence in the preceding Liberal Government it was probably uncomfortable.

> [NORAD] is actually a NATO command set up within the Canada - U.S. region, and actually this command will report to the Standing Group, and as required, to the Council. It does not have to be designated a NATO command to come under the NATO umbrella and actually nations are encouraged to make bilateral arrangements in order to achieve balanced forces and a more efficient system of command.[115]

Public concern over the agreement as well as the sniping of the Liberal opposition forced the government to couch NORAD in NATO terms. Whether or not the government understood the implications of such a move is not clear. In any event it was a move which would come back to haunt them as the debate over NORAD grew in intensity.

External Affairs also expressed concern over the NORAD agreement based on the lack of any formal agreement or exchange of notes. Concern over this point was being expressed even within American military circles. General Partridge, soon to be Commander in Chief of the newly created NORAD, recognized that the agreement lacked formality. Partridge, a keen advocate of an integrated command structure, stipulated, "it is imperative that there be a binding agreement between the governments of the two countries recognizing the indivisible nature of the air defence of North America."[116]The American Joint Chiefs of Staff in responding to Partridge explained that the informal path had been chosen because of the political sensitivities present in Canada over sovereignty and because of the American desire to avoid any possible linkage between NATO and continental defence.[117]It is apparent that the American Joint Chiefs were determined to exclude the diplomats on both sides of the border as much as possible.[118]

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[115]. see note 78.

The Canadian Chiefs shared the desire to exclude the career diplomats from any meaningful role in what they perceived as an exclusively military matter. Diefenbaker had given his approval of the integrated command based on that advice and information which he had received from the Department of National Defence and in particular the uniformed members of the department. The career diplomats in the Department of External Affairs had consciously been excluded by the military and the actions of the Prime Minister served to further exacerbate those concerns which the career diplomats held.[119] His advice had come principally from General Foulkes who had tried to minimize the importance of the agreement, presumably to speed its approval. The agreement was not, however, unimportant and it had been of concern to External Affairs for at least the previous two years.[120]

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[116] Jockel, op cit., pp. 103-104.

[117] Ibid., p. 104.

[118] Ibid.

Once the agreement was announced on August 1st, 1957 the Department of External Affairs began agitating for the formalization of the agreement through an exchange of notes.[121] General Foulkes correctly perceived that such a note could involve further negotiation and perhaps force the inclusion or exclusion of elements unacceptable to the military.[122] In addition the RCAF had promised the Americans that it could deliver Canadian approval in a speedy fashion and without undue diplomatic interference. In responding to the External request Foulkes asserted that the notes were not required due to the approval given by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence. Despite the rationale provided by Foulkes, Smith at External did not relent. The Department of External Affairs wanted not only an exchange of notes to be negotiated at the diplomatic level but wanted these notes to be tabled in the House of Commons. For the Canadian military this would constitute nothing less than an embarrassment and could threaten not only the agreement as negotiated but the relationship which existed between the RCAF and the USAF. Foulkes went to Pearkes and urged him to oppose External's attempts to draw the agreement into the diplomatic arena.[123]Foulkes contended that many agreements existed between the United States and Canada on matters of defence which had either not been formalized through an exchange of notes or had not been subject to open debate in the House of Commons. Foulkes was essentially correct on this point. The Ogdensburg Agreement, the Hyde Park Agreement, the Joint Statement By the Governments of Canada and the United States Regarding Defence Cooperation Between the Two Countries of 1947 all constitute examples of the former and the Exchange of Letters Between Canada and the United States Constituting an Agreement Giving Formal Effect to the "Security Agreement between Canada and the United States" provides an example of the latter.[124] Foulkes also contended that a formalized agreement would deprive the two respective armed forces of the ability to make changes to the structure of NORAD as time went by.[125]

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[119] Holmes to Bryce, "Integration of Operational Control of Canadian and Continental United States Air Defence Forces in Peacetime", July 31, 1957, National Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs Files, 908017-01.

[120] McLin, op cit., p. 44.

[121] McLin, op cit., p. 107.

[122] Ibid.

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[123]. Jockel, op cit., p. 108.

The military establishments in both the United States and Canada had, up until 1957, created a relationship which was both extremely close and comfortable. They had done this in the conscious attempt to exclude the relationship from either undue political or diplomatic interference.[126] The manner in which the Canadian military handled the negotiation of the NORAD agreement and the political wrangling which followed threatened this relationship. Thus when the matter was tabled in the House of Commons following the exchange of notes on May 12th, 1958 the relationship was placed under close scrutiny. The debate itself served to provide tremendous support for the position of the Department of External Affairs. While an informal or even verbal agreement was suited to the relationship between the respective militaries, it was inconsistent with either established practice or the need to placate political sensitivities in Canada. Immediately the Liberal Opposition questioned the informality of the agreement. It became apparent to the opposition that no Order in Council had been given regarding the agreement and further that the Cabinet had not even considered the issue. It is apparent that in the confusion generated by the election and based on the inexperience of the new Diefenbaker government, the military was being left to work out the agreement to the complete exclusion of diplomatic formality. The views of the Department of External Affairs were clearly enunciated by the Liberal Opposition who quickly attacked the government over its failure to follow established procedure.[127]

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[124] A Top Secret document generated by External Affairs in 1954 lists some nine exchanges of notes or letters regarding Canadian-American bilateral defence cooperation of "Which no Reference Has Been Made in Parliament". "Canadian-American Defence Cooperation" October 18, 1954, National Archives Canada, Department of External Affairs file 703-AR-40.

[125] Jockel. op cit., p. 108.

[126] Ibid.

The debate over NORAD which ensued in the summer of 1958 brought to light many substantial questions regarding the NORAD agreement. Notwithstanding the procedural improprieties other questions of substance remained to be resolved. What type of command structure would become apparent in light of the agreement and what provision for non military consultation had been included were questions which no-one seemed able or willing at the time to answer. Other questions such as the type and numbers of aircraft or what other weapons systems would be required also remained.

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[127]. The Liberal attacks were somewhat hypocritical in that the agreements cited at note 124 were never tabled in Parliament and in fact many remained secret for a number of years.

The government's inability to provide clarification played well for the Department of External Affairs. The informality of the agreement was once again assailed. Implicit in the political furore which had arisen over the failure of the Diefenbaker government to pursue a formalized agreement was the impropriety, at least in External Affairs eyes, of allowing the military to negotiate and implement an international agreement.This, in spite of the evolution and virtually complete air defence integration between the United States and Canada. At the heart of this point is no less fundamental an issue than that of civilian control over the military, an issue which for obvious reasons was of great concern to not only the Department of External Affairs but many both inside and outside of government.

Conflict arose between the Department of External Affairs and the military establishment in Canada over the NORAD agreement based on five points. These included the lack of a formal exchange of notes which would have necessarily brought External Affairs into the negotiations and allowed the Department to exercise some control over the course of those negotiations. Second, and related to the first, by being excluded from the negotiations and the final agreement, External Affairs was not able to link the obvious American desire to construct an integrated command with concessions on other issues such as trade or with respect to

NATO.[128] This point in fact was raised by the Liberal opposition during the NORAD debate in 1958. Third, External Affairs found itself in a position with which it was both unaccustomed and uncomfortable. During the preceding decade External had enjoyed a preeminent position within the Canadian bureaucracy and government. Close relationships between the ruling Liberal party and senior Department bureaucrats existed, a matter which is well documented. John Diefenbaker became prime minister harbouring suspicions about the political reliability of many senior members of the Department of External Affairs. The NORAD issue provided, for External Affairs, an example of possible things to come. Additionally, the military establishment had succeeded in excluding External, at least initially, from the agreement, a matter which must have seriously offended the sensibilities of the career diplomats. Finally the "Grand Design" of "participatory internationalism" which External Affairs had been so carefully tending in the post-war years seemed threatened. Close bilateralism with the United States seemed, in all its ramifications, to run counter to the goals of post-war foreign policy. Multilateralism, especially in the NATO framework, was designed to provide a counter to the "dangers of a too

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[128] McLin, op cit., p. 58.

exclusively continental relationship".[129]
This policy now seemed threatened.

The fact that the Department of National Defence, or indeed, the Diefenbaker government was compelled to negotiate on the diplomatic level an exchange of notes regarding NORAD and that the agreement was the subject of Parliamentary debate, mitigated some of the loss of influence which External Affairs suffered over NORAD. To be sure, whatever grip the military establishment in Canada and the Department of National Defence had succeeded in obtaining over the direction of defence or foreign policy was shortlived. Even the matter relating to consultation would eventually be satisfied to External's approval with the fallout from the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.[130]While the Department of National Defence may have won the battle it was slowly losing the war.

Throughout the debate over the integration of the air defence command network for North America, only scant opposition existed regarding the wisdom of the overall plan. Both the Liberal Party and the CCF were in general agreement but wanted NORAD in some way to be incorporated into the NATO framework. This advocacy, on behalf of the Liberal Party under Lester B. Pearson, was more rhetorical than real, and on behalf of the CCF was somewhat anomalous in that many CCF members advocated a withdrawal from NATO. Despite this, the objections of the opposition parties seem to be more properly in keeping with the objections which were being raised within the Department of External Affairs. The non-procedural objections to NORAD were, it seems, based on its purely bilateral character, a fact which must have been received somewhat happily by External Affairs. In the end some of the objections which External Affairs had raised over the agreement were resolved to the department's satisfaction. Notes were exchanged, consultation was formalized, and the firm grasp it held over foreign and defence policy was recouped. While the agreement remained bilateral in character this was a reality which External as well as the Liberal opposition and the CCF knew they had to live with. American resolve on this point was firm. While the "Grand Design" may have emerged somewhat tarnished, multilateralism remained the hallmark of Canadian foreign policy.

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[129] Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, op cit., p. 33.

[130] Ibid., p. 52.

SECTION IV

Procurement and the Dilemmas of Canadian Defence Policy

The commitments which Canada undertook as a result of the defence and foreign policy decisions of the immediate post-war period made necessary the acquisition of capabilities in keeping with those commitments. Canadian membership in NATO and the later dispatch of troops and Canadian continental defense efforts both established the requirement for new and differing types of equipment. Throughout the post-war period Canada was forced to grapple with the question of procurement as defense and foreign policy unfolded and evolved. The procurement decisions which were made as a result of policy choices are indicative of the priorities of the government and serve to highlight the underpinnings of any policy choice. Jon B. McLin in his discussion of the acquisition of equipment for North American defense stipulates that,

> In the (NORAD debate), there was basic agreement among the principal parties to the dispute of the strategic desirability of a joint command. Given the decision to have active defense against the manned bomber, the controversy arose from political and constitutional factors which could largely have been avoided. The purchase of expensive aircraft and missiles, on

> the other hand, raises problems which are inescapable; therefore consideration of such purchases directed attention, in however confused a fashion, to the basic questions of defense policy: What should be the scope of the total defense effort, and what is the most appropriate way to allocate the sum of these limited resources?[131]

The period under consideration provides a number of examples in which major military equipment procurement had to be undertaken. Among these is the acquisition of fighter aircraft both in terms of interceptor aircraft for continental defense purposes and strike/fighter aircraft for use with No. 1 Air Division in Europe; acquisition of missiles and armoured vehicles for Canadian forces on the central front; and the acquisition of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, which will be examined in the following chapter. In each instance the procurement of weapons and weapons systems was preceded by controversy and debate. Disagreement within the bureaucracy over roles and functions of the Canadian Forces and in a larger sense, controversy over the broader direction of defense and foreign policy often delayed or changed the acquisition of equipment.

A NEW FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

The cancellation of the *CF-105 Arrow* had the result of leaving Canada's aging airforce without a replacement. The existing *CF-100* and *F-86* aircraft had become obsolete and required replacement in order to fulfil the commitments undertaken both in Europe and in North America.[132] Following the cancellation of the *CF-105 Arrow*, a search for a replacement aircraft from among existing (American) designs was undertaken. From the start the search for a new aircraft was fraught with a number of political sensitivities including: the receipt of aircraft or any other equipment from the United States must not appear as mutual aid;[133]some or all of the manufacturing of the aircraft or other equipment should be done in Canada by Canadian companies;[134]failure to expend resources and acquire capabilities might offend the United States and lessen Canada's ability to influence the United States in the defense field;[135]similarly diminution of the effectiveness of the Canadian commitment to NATO based on the lack of modern equipment could impair relations with Canada's European allies, and;[136] defense expenditures must not impair initiatives within the non-military or diplomatic sphere.[137]

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[131] McLin, op cit., p. 60.

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[132] Then commander of NORAD General Laurence Kuter indicated that the acquisition of a new aircraft by Canada was required for a meaningful contribution to continental defense. Montreal Daily Star, November 18, 1959.

[133] Memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee, "Continental Air Defense - Foreign Policy Implications", op cit., see note 78.

[134] The Diefenbaker government was suffering politically from the cancellation of the Arrow and the purchase of an American aircraft following the termination of contracts for a Canadian aircraft could have fanned the apparent political dissatisfaction. Additionally the Conservative government was sensitive to the implications of the Arrow cancellation in that Canada was incapable of producing modern, sophisticated aircraft because the cost was prohibitive.

The effects which the above outlined political sensitivities had on the equipping of the Canadian military in the late 1950s was such that roles and functions were adopted to fit the types of equipment which political expediency demanded. Further, political considerations often delayed decisions, lengthening delivery dates, in which time the strategic threat often changed, lessening Canadian credibility. Such a loss of credibility was, in most cases, the result of the attainment of capabilities which were no longer relevant. In other words, money wasted. In short, the acquisition of capabilities was too often based on political considerations rather than on considerations of what types of equipment were strategically or tactically sound.

Following the cancellation of the *CF-105 Arrow* the government determined that a requirement remained for the RCAF to receive modern supersonic jet aircraft.[138] The political sensitivities outlined above, however, served to restrict the number and range of options and thus aircraft which could be procured as a replacement. When the decision finally was rendered in 1961 the American *F-101B Voodoo* was chosen. Choice of the *F-101B Voodoo* was based on a number of considerations. Although the requirement for new aircraft for use in North America was clear[139] the ultimate rationale for the procurement and the manner in which the *F-101B Voodoo* was procured were political.[140]

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[135] Memorandum to the Cabinet Defense Committee, "Continental Air Defence - Foreign Policy Implications," op cit., see note 78.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Ibid.

The initial proposal for the acquisition of the *F-101B Voodoo* involved a "swap" of some 70 *Voodoos* for a number of Canadair *CL-44* transport aircraft and the takeover by Canada of a number of the Pinetree line facilities which the United States was currently operating. This initial proposal was seen to be politically acceptable based on the reciprocal nature of the deal which would, it was offered, forego the appearance of Canada receiving American aid. Additionally, the purchase by Canada, of American aircraft, may have appeared as "a concession of defeat to the American aircraft lobby" within the United States[141] if Canadian aircraft manufacturers had not been somehow involved. Further orders, it was contemplated, might also arise for Canadian companies. Quickly, however, disagreement arose within the cabinet, most notably from Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs, who was particularly sensitive to the appearance of Canada receiving aid through the deal. Others disliked the fact that orders for aircraft which would have gone to AVRO in Toronto would now go to Canadair in Montreal.[142] Other political considerations were offered in defense of the deal, including the return of responsibility for a number of the Pinetree line facilities to Canada, which would have played well for the issue of sovereignty. In addition, it was suggested that five previously agreed to radar installations in Western Canada be cancelled. Operation of the Western radars, it was suggested, would move the air battle, in the event of a bomber attack, almost exclusively into Canada.

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[138] Memorandum for the Prime Minister, National Archives, 32-B 19, Vol 57, n.d.

[139] Aide Memoire, Chiefs of Staff Committee, "The F-101B as a Replacement for the CF-100", 27 April 1961, National Archives Canada, Chiefs of Staff Committee Files RG-12, 44-89.

[140] McLin, op cit., p.102.

> From a Canadian point of view, I believe we would be at a disadvantage, although military opinion does not accept this, in moving the likely area of air battle from roughly along the 49th parallel to roughly a line through Calgary, Saskatoon and 100 miles north of

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[141] McLin, op cit., p. 103.

[142] Ibid.

> Winnipeg. I would think it is almost inevitable that some of the newspaper defense "experts" would finally get onto this idea and you are well aware of what the effect on people in Western Canada would be of articles along this line.[143]

The swap deal fell apart as re-equipment of the Air Division in Europe leaned towards the *F-104G*. The deal finally fleshed out to include the provision of $50 million by Canada in the form of aid to several European countries for the purchase of the *F-104G*, a portion of which would be manufactured in Montreal by Canadair; Canada would receive, for its participation, some sixty-six *F-101B Voodoos'*. It would appear that the existing political considerations were largely satisfied and the airforce got its new aircraft.

Procurement of the *F-104G* for the Air Division in Europe complemented the existing deal to acquire the *F-101B Voodoo* for continental defence. Essentially they were part of the same deal. The delay in announcing the deal to acquire both the *F-101B Voodoo* and the *F-104G* was based on the requirement to preclude the appearance of the cancellation of a Canadian aircraft in favour of an American aircraft and because hope was still held out for the possible production and use of the *CF-105 Arrow* in Europe.

> [I]t would have been bad politics to buy an American aircraft when a Canadian one was being cancelled, and also because the possibility of using the Arrow in

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[143]. see note 128.

> Europe meant that a role might have to be chosen to suit the aircraft, rather than the reverse.[144]

Selection of the *F-104G* over other contenders was further based on its suitability for export and the number of jobs which production of the aircraft in Canada would provide. Selection of the *F-104G* would, however, have greater political significance as the debate over the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forces heated-up. The *F-104G* was essentially a strike aircraft designed to deliver ordinance behind enemy lines, the most advantageous ordinance, as with the *BOMARC* missile would be nuclear. The Diefenbaker government carefully avoided mention of nuclear weapons for the Air Division but was aware that the arming of the aircraft with nuclear weapons would constitute its most advantageous use.[145]Critics of the acquisition were aware also of the arming of the *F-104G* with nuclear weapons as its most advantageous use and noted that such an armament would change the "whole posture (of the Air Division in Europe) and inevitably the posture of the nation."[146]Such comments were indeed insightful and served to presage the upcoming nuclear weapons acquisition debate. The political considerations which had made the *F-104G* so attractive would come to haunt the Diefenbaker government and further the requirement to define Canada's role in NATO.

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[144] McLin, op cit., p. 116.

[145] Memorandum, Minister of National Defense, "CF-105 AVRO Arrow Programme", January 30th, 1959. National Archives Canada, Department of National Defence Files RG-12, 908020-1.

[146] Toronto Globe and Mail, July 4, 1959.

THE BRIGADE IN EUROPE

It was not only the procurement of aircraft in the late 1950s and early 1960s which served to highlight the primacy of political considerations in the acquisition of equipment for the Canadian forces. As part of the NATO commitment a brigade-group sized formation had been sent to Europe in the early 1950s and was occupying a portion of the central front. By the late 1950s it was becoming increasingly clear that steps had to be taken either to enhance the capabilities of the brigade-group's weapons and weapons systems or change its role. Withdrawal from the forward, front-line position carried many of the same political overtones which wholesale withdrawal from the continent entailed and so this option was not seriously considered.[147]

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[147] McLin, p. 111. It was suggested at the time that withdrawal could have the effect of isolating Canada from the North Atlantic community thereby obviating Canada's ability to exercise influence over North Atlantic decision making. In addition matters of trade and the pursuit of Canadian non-military political objectives could be hindered or rendered impossible. See John W. Holmes ed., No Other Way: Canada and

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The reequipping of the Canadian NATO brigade was influenced by two factors: one military and one political. The military consideration was that the weapons which the Canadian brigade held must be equal or superior to the weapons of the potential enemy. Second, and political in nature, was the consideration that Canada not employ weapons which were inferior in nature to those which other NATO allies employed in performing similar functions.[148] As such, and in keeping with the nuclear strategy of NATO, Canada required both nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and the enhancement of the brigade's mobility. In June 1960 the decision was announced that the Canadian brigade in Europe would be equipped with the American *Honest John* missile. As with the *BOMARC* and the *F-104G* the most efficient use of the *Honest John* system was in conjunction with a nuclear warhead. The government sought to avoid mention of this until pressed by Opposition questioning in the House of Commons.[149] Although acquisition of the *Honest John* missile attracted less controversy and notoriety, many of the political considerations which were apparent in the decision to acquire both the *F-104B Voodoo* and the *F-104G*

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[147] (...continued) International Security Institutions and, Don Munton and John Kirton eds., Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases.

[148] Ibid., p. 112.

[149] Debates, House of Commons, 1960, III, p. 2644.

aircraft reappear. In its search for a military role in NATO Canada had opted for that role which would provide the greatest return relative to its contribution. Acceptance of the commitment to hold a portion of the central front demanded that Canada acquire offensive, strike-oriented weapons. Thorough analysis of the military ramifications of the forward role may have either changed or altered the decision to stay on the central front, although this is unclear. By allowing political considerations to drive the realization of defence policy and thus procurement Canadian politicians had succeeded in limiting the range of options available to Canada: in the case of the *Honest John*, either accept short-range nuclear missiles or withdraw and suffer the political consequences. As the historical record demonstrates, it may have been less damaging and embarrassing to argue forcefully for a change in Canada's NATO role.

The various debates which arose over the procurement of weapons and weapons systems exhibited, to a degree, the coinciding of interests of the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence.[150] While Defence was unhappy with the delays in decisions it was content in that the roles it had been ascribed were meaningful and held significant profile. With the Air Division in Europe and the NORAD commitment firmly intact acquisition of any suitable aircraft would be acceptable.[151] Similarly the positioning of the Canadian NATO brigade on the central front garnered the military considerable respect among the deployed NATO allies. The Department of External Affairs was able throughout the procurement debates to influence the decision making in keeping with the politically sensitive issues of sovereignty, mutual aid, Canada's international standing and posture and non-military or diplomatic objectives. The apparent bureaucratic detente was shortlived, however, as the nuclear weapons acquisition debate forced the most difficult and most controversial questions surrounding Canadian foreign and defense policy to be answered.

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[150] The Cabinet Defense Committee and the Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that the CF-105 Arrow be cancelled based on its cost. National Archives Canada, Cabinet Defense Committee Files, July 8, 1959, RG-12, 908020-1, p.2.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR CANADA

The fall of the Diefenbaker government in early February 1963 was prefaced by a broad and sweeping debate over the direction of Canadian foreign and defense policy. Few other debates over the direction of national policy have proven to be as divisive or far reaching. To place the debate in perspective, only two governments in Canadian history have suffered the loss of a vote of non-confidence.

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[151] . Cabinet Decisions, NAtional Archives Canada, Privy Council Office Files, July 8, 1959, p.11.

The government of John Diefenbaker was the second and last; it fell largely due to its indecision over the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the Canadian forces. Such indecision was fostered by fragmentation and the lack of a consensus within the Canadian cabinet and bureaucracy.

For some involved in the debate and controversy, its origins can be found in the appointment of Howard Green as Secretary of State for External Affairs following the death of Sidney Smith in March 1959.[152]Smith as Secretary of State for External Affairs had largely allowed decisions pertaining to the procurement of weapons and weapons systems for the Canadian Forces to pass through Cabinet without diplomatic scrutiny. Decisions to acquire weapons were based on "strategic, economic and political considerations" rather than on considerations properly considered to be within the diplomatic realm.[153]Although Green's impact on the debate and ensuing controversy, as will be demonstrated, was fundamental, its true origins lie in the decisions to procure missiles and aircraft, the most advantageous use of which was when armed with nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker declared in 1958 that, "the full potential of these defensive weapons (BOMARC missiles) is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads".[154] The controversy grew, inflamed by international events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, until division within the Cabinet and the resignation of Douglas Harkness as Minister of National Defence finally prompted the toppling of the government.

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[152]. D.S. Harkness, "The Nuclear Arms Question and the Political Crisis Which Arose From it in January and February, 1963", commentary written on board SS Roonage Head enroute from Quebec City to Liverpool, August 19 to August 27, 1963 based on dairies kept during the period of the Cuban crisis and in January and February, 1963. National Archives Canada, RG-12.

[153]. J.F. Hilliker, "Diefenbaker and Canadian External Relations", in J.L. Granatstein, Canadian Foreign Policy, op cit., p. 183.

Following the victory of John Diefenbaker's Conservatives, Diefenbaker sought to exclude the career diplomats of the Department of External Affairs from the processes of determining foreign affairs. Such exclusion was based on Diefenbaker's belief that the Department of External Affairs was sympathetic to the Liberal opposition and in particular Lester Pearson.[155] Advice from the career hierarchy within External Affairs was received by Diefenbaker with suspicion. Such suspicion remained even following the appointment of Sidney Smith as Secretary in September 1957. Smith had been chosen as Secretary of State for External Affairs from outside the Conservative caucus and, while respected, he nevertheless held a weak position within the cabinet.[156] The weakness of Smith's position, combined with Diefenbaker's distrust of the permanent departmental staff, resulted in the exclusion of External Affairs from the decision- making process. In his discussion of the nuclear weapons question John F. Hilliker asserts that, "[A]ccording to Cabinet conclusions, diplomatic objectives did not feature in discussions of equipment for the armed forces."[157]The views, opinions and ultimately the direction of foreign policy, as advocated by others within the bureaucracy and cabinet, subsumed those of the Department of External Affairs.

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[154] Ibid., Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, p. 117.

[155] John F. Hilliker, op cit., p. 185.

In March 1959, at the time of Sidney Smith's death, Canadian policy as it pertained to the acquisition of nuclear weapons was fairly consistent. Cabinet decisions to acquire the *BOMARC*, *Honest John* and *F-104* were taken in view of their being armed with nuclear warheads,

> there was no question in anyone's mind, so far as I am aware, over the fact that they (*BOMARC, Honest John and F-104*) would be equipped with nuclear warheads. It was accepted that they would be so equipped and no objection was raised to this in the cabinet discussion on the matter.[158]

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[156] Ibid.

[157] Hilliker, op cit., p. 186.

[158] D.S. Harkness, " The Nuclear Arms Question and the Political Crisis Which Arose From it in January and February, (continued...)

The "B" variant of the *BOMARC*, which Canada acquired, was designed exclusively to carry a nuclear warhead[159] and had been procured in large measure to fill the gap in air defence left by the cancellation of the *CF-105 Arrow*.[160] In light of the perceived threat from both manned bombers and missiles, acquisition of the nuclear tipped *BOMARC* made both military and economic sense.[161] The actual effectiveness of the weapons notwithstanding, the concept of utilizing nuclear weapons for air defence was firm.

The decision to acquire the *Honest John* missile for the Canadian brigade group on the central front was based on the requirement to enhance the brigade's firepower. Firepower, as it was understood in contemporary NATO strategy, was nuclear firepower. National forces positioned in Europe and particularly along the central front were expected to acquire and deploy nuclear weapons in keeping with the alliance's declared strategy of nuclear deterrence.[162] The

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[158] (...continued)
1963", op cit., p. 1. see note 150.

[159] McLin, op cit., p. 131.

[160] J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, op cit., p. 117.

[161] McLin, op cit., p. 132.

[162] Ibid.

Diefenbaker government's hesitancy prompted some within NATO publicly to state that a Canadian failure to acquire nuclear weapons for its forces would amount to Canada reneging on its obligations. While visiting Canada in 1963, the newly retired supreme allied commander in Europe, General Lauris Norstad, articulated the belief "that Canada would not be fulfilling its obligations to NATO unless nuclear weapons were provided".[163]Paul Hellyer the Liberal party defence critic, agreed and stipulated that should Canada refuse to accept nuclear weapons, "there will be intense pressure on us to withdraw and turn the facilities over to others".[164]

Similarly, Canada had acquired the *F-104B Voodoo* to reequip the Canadian Air Division as part of its commitment to NATO. The acquisition reflected the role of the Air Division which was one of "strike reconnaissance". The "strike reconnaissance" role was by its nature a nuclear role as defined by NATO strategy. In addition the *F-104* was designed, almost exclusively, with regards to it being armed with nuclear weapons.[165]

The consistency which typified Canadian defence policy prior to the death of Sidney Smith quickly evaporated as Diefenbaker named the former Minister for Public Works, Howard Green, to replace Smith. The first omens of things to come appeared as a result of a little known air-defence exercise referred to as Operation *Skyhawk*. Operation *Skyhawk* was conceived as a North- America wide air-defence exercise, the aim of which was to test NORAD defences in a simulated Soviet bomber attack. Planning on behalf of the Canadian and American militaries and other departments within both governments had been ongoing for over six months when External Affairs first became aware of the proposed exercise.[166]After reading the reservations of the assistant under-secretary John Holmes, Green declared that the exercise was "totally inappropriate and provocative".[167]Such a belief was premised, according to Green, on the upcoming visit of Nikita Khrushchev to the United Nations. The Cabinet agreed and the exercise was halted. American officials were outraged at the Canadian about-turn and twice summoned the Canadian Ambassador, Arnold Heeney, to the State Department to hear of the American "shock".[168]

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[163] Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet, "Deploying Nuclear Weapons, 1962-1963", in Don Munton and John Kirton eds., Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough Ont: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc, 1992), p. 105.

[164] Ibid., p. 106.

[165] McLin, op cit., p. 132.

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[166] J.L. Granatstein, Canada, 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, op cit., p. 110.

[167] Ibid.

[168] Ibid.

For many the *Skyhawk* incident served to expose a growing lack of cohesiveness within the cabinet. Heeney observed that the "procedures"[169]of government appeared to have broken down. J.L. Granatstein goes further in noting,

> What *Skyhawk* had demonstrated was that there was an element of capriciousness in External Affairs and in the Cabinet. It was almost as if the department had been piqued to learn of the exercise so late.[170]

When Green came to External Affairs he brought with him a predisposition Jon B. McLin has termed "anti-American"[171]and a reputation for undertaking issues with a fervent moralism which once embarked upon could not be altered. Such moralism quickly became tied to the belief in disarmament as a fundamental means of avoiding a third world war.[172]Green saw disarmament as the "the main way in which world peace can eventually be achieved",[173]and perceived a potential Canadian acquisition of nuclear weapons as degrading the capability of Canada to pursue disarmament as a national policy.

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[169] Ibid.

[170] Ibid., p. 111.

[171] McLin,op cit., p. 136. See also Peyton Lyon, The Policy Question, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), p. 93.

[172] J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, op cit., p. 117.

[173] Jon B. McLin., op cit., p. 136.

Howard Green's advocacy of disarmament placed himself and External Affairs on a collision course with the Department of National Defence. It was clear to both Douglas Harkness and his predecessor as Minister of National Defence, George Pearkes, that nuclear weapons would become part of the Canadian arsenal. From the time of the acquisition of the *BOMARC* missile in 1958 and both the *Honest John* and the *F-104*, Canadian defence policy was premised on the assumption that these weapons systems would utilize nuclear armaments.[174] For most, especially those within the Department of National Defence, acquisition of nuclear weapons was already decided upon:

> The military wanted the weapons; External Affairs apparently had no objections, subject only to the terms of the agreements being satisfactorily worked out; and the Prime Minister and the Cabinet were also apparently in favour. The formal and final decision to take nuclear weapons had not yet been made, to be sure, but all the evidence leads inescapably to the conclusion that this would be simply the final seal of approval on a decision made long before.[175]

The foregone nature of the decision to arm the Canadian

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[174] J.L. Granatstein, Canada, 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, op cit., p. 118.

[175] Ibid.

Forces with nuclear weapons quickly evaporated as Howard Green's belief in disarmament solidified. Within External Affairs Green's position was buttressed by notable career diplomats such as Norman Robertson who had served as the High Commissioner in London and the Ambassador in Washington and now occupied the position of deputy minister. Both Green and Robertson were convinced that Canada should pursue a foreign policy path which would lessen the possibility of nuclear war and its consequences. For Green, more so than Robertson, this meant a policy of disarmament. To advocate disarmament and yet deploy nuclear weapons was seen by Green to be irresponsible and "foolish".[176]

Within Cabinet, Green was able to garner support from those ministers who were concerned about matters of sovereignty and national control, particularly within Canada.[177]Others, who believed the acquisition to be necessary, cited concerns about the reaction of the United States and the other NATO allies and the possible impact which refusal to accept nuclear weapons would have on existing international economic arrangements and Canada's influence in other areas. Within the government and bureaucracy the controversy came to align itself along two poles: the pro-nuclear weapons advocates represented by Douglas Harkness at the Department of National Defence and those opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons represented by Howard Green at External Affairs. Never before had the government and the bureaucracy been so clearly divided over a defence issue.

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[176] Ibid., p. 125.

[177] Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet, "Deploying Nuclear Weapons, 1962-1963", op cit., p. 103.

At issue was not just weapons or weapons systems but the underlying principles which drove Canadian foreign and defence policy. External Affairs and the Department of National Defence became locked in a broad and encompassing struggle for the direction of foreign and defence policy. In the view espoused by Green and others at External Affairs, Canada should adopt a foreign policy the primary emphasis of which would be peace and stability through disarmament and a rejection of the traditional alliance and deterrence approach. For obvious reasons National Defence and the uniformed military were not enthusiastic about the prospects of disarmament. Although some officers were not in favour of a nuclear role, commitment to collective defence and deterrence was firm.[178]Writing shortly after his resignation, Harkness was forthright in stipulating his position,

> As a government we had followed a defence policy of full support for NATO and NORAD. We had agreed to supply four weapons systems, and our allies counted

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[178] McLin, op cit., p. 144.

> on us to contribute this strength... The security of the country demanded that we provide the most effective defence possible and this could only be done arming with nuclear ammunition. With the weapons systems already in the hands of our troops, no further delay was tolerable -- in fact we were presently in default. I could not agree to, and attempt to defend, a policy of continued delay, in which I did not believe, and which I considered to be dangerous to the interests of the country and the Western Alliance.[179]

Howard Green's pursuit of disarmament was not entirely out of step with Canadian foreign policy. Throughout the post war period Canada had been a consistent advocate of disarmament, participating in nearly every significant post war disarmament forum.[180]Canada's participation was consistent with the liberal internationalist approach and the role of lesser powers. What rendered Howard Green's approach to the disarmament question and Canada's role in it as distinct was the desire, of Green and others in External Affairs to follow a path independent of the American appreciation and definition of the prevailing security environment. The independent nature of Canadian disarmament policy vis-a-vis the United States as conceived by Green was attractive to Diefenbaker who had, throughout his political life, desired a Canada less closely aligned with the United States. By 1961 it was apparent that,

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[179] Douglas Harkness, "The Nuclear Arms Question and the Political Crisis Which Arose From It in January and February, 1963", op cit., p. 24. See note 150.

[180] McLin, op cit., p. 147.

> the Diefenbaker government, under the influence of Howard Green, was prepared to reduce to ineffectiveness a large part of Canada's military forces rather than suffer what might have been a marginal reduction in the effectiveness of Canada's disarmament policy...[181]

Jon B. McLin suggests that this willingness was premised on the Canadian appreciation that the United States would defend Canada regardless of Canada's independence in foreign affairs. The unique nature of the Canadian-American relationship gave rise to a situation in which Canada could enjoy the "luxury" of pursuing a disarmament policy "which, for other countries would have been reckless".[182]An additional enticement, according to McLin, was the ever present Canadian desire to follow a foreign policy course different from the United States simply because it was different.[183]

Within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, substantial expectations had been generated with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Continual delays in rendering a decision resulted in substantial frustration both in the Minister of National Defence and among the department's uniformed officials. As the debate within cabinet wore on and Green slowly was able to sway the opinion of the Prime Minister towards his position, the military bureaucracy was left in a position in opposition to the elected government.[184] The untenable nature of such a situation led to the resignation of the Minister of National Defence and precipitated a vote of non-confidence in Parliament. The Liberal Opposition under Lester Pearson, one of the principal architects of Canada's post-war foreign policies, won the ensuing election by offering to reaffirm those policy choices which had largely guided Canada since 1945. During the election campaign Pearson clearly spelled out Canadian post-war foreign policy and the reasons underlying it.

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[181] Ibid., p. 150.

[182] Ibid., p.151.

[183] Ibid.

> Canada's acceptance of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes has been part of a consistent attempt to have nations of the western alliance share in a single nuclear deterrent rather than develop individual deterrents of their own. In the past year or so there has been a tendency, noticeably in one quarter, for nations to break away from this common purpose... If we, too, were to opt out of the common program, even if it were to avoid having any nuclear weapons at all rather than to develop such weapons on our own, we would be encouraging by precept and example a trend which is fraught with serious dangers for the

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[184] Howard H. Lentner, "Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Case of Canada and Nuclear Weapons", World Politics, vol. 29, p. 48.

free world.[185]

Pearson went on to state that should Canada withdraw from collective defence arrangements, Canada's "influence in the cause of world peace would be negligible".[186]

Whatever Pearson's motives were, and some have expressed the belief that they were political in nature,[187]his position was clearly supportive of Douglas Harkness and the military bureaucracy. It is clear how untenable the government of John Diefenbaker became as significant aspects of the bureaucracy were in agreement with the policies of the opposition party.

The alignment of Pearson's views with those of the Canadian military did not, as has been demonstrated, constitute a normal state of affairs. During the Liberal Government of Louis St. Laurent, in which Pearson was a significant player in External Affairs, the views of the Department of National Defence were often contrary to those held by External. It was characteristic of the period in which Pearson served in External Affairs that the political rationale was, in most cases, the principal rationale subsuming pure military concerns. Despite domestic Canadian party politics the nuclear weapons debate serves to indicate the level and degree to which political concerns influenced defence policy. Even after commitments had been undertaken and a clear intention demonstrated, matters of pure politics intervened to force open the commitment-capability gap. The failure of the government and bureaucracy to arrive at a unified appreciation of the prevailing security environment served, once again, to make tenuous the link between security and defence policy. Canadian defence policy was, by the early 1960's clearly confused and in disarray.

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[185] quoted in Ibid., p. 61.

[186] Ibid., p.62.

[187] see Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet, "Deploying Nuclear Weapons, 1962-63", op cit.

Ultimately, the debate over the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forces moved beyond the cabinet room and the bureaucracy and into the public domain. As fierce as the debate had been, it intensified, calling into question many of the basic tenets of Canadian foreign policy. The divisiveness which was exhibited within government and among the bureaucratic elites was reflected in Canadian society as a whole. The issues were no less significant than Canada's role in the international community and how Canada sought to protect its interests abroad.

CONCLUSION

The victory of Lester Pearson's Liberal Party in February 1963 brought to an end the debate over the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forces. Although the controversy remained, Canada formally equipped its forces with nuclear weapons, following agreement with the United States in the summer of 1963. The nuclear weapons acquisition debate had served clearly to demonstrate the degree to which bureaucratic conflict and competition shape Canadian defence and security policy and how the lack of consensus exposed a substantial gulf between the commitments undertaken and the resources which Canada as a nation has been willing or able to allocate to those commitments. Although one of the most indicative, the nuclear weapons acquisition debate represents one in a series of decisions and controversies in which elements of the bureaucracy were drawn into conflict with each other over the direction of security and defence policy. Such conflict exposed a lack of consensus over the basis of security and defence policy and contributed to a substantial gap between commitments and capabilities.

In general, the immediate post-war era served to demonstrate that a considerable gulf exists between the measures which Canada undertakes in the form of a defence policy and the actual security of Canada. It is apparent that if Canada did not enjoy the luxury of its current demographics and geography, the lack of bureaucratic and governmental consensus and the gulf between policies and resources which resulted could, conceivably, impair Canadian national interests. The ability of superpowers to define the prevailing security environment and in particular the geographic proximity of the United States to Canada has, however, rendered independent national security polices less relevant to overall Canadian national security.

Canada's unique position is such that military imperatives lose relevance based on the tacit understanding that the United States would, out of self-interest, defend Canada and ensure that no foreign power acquired influence either political or territorial within Canada. Canadian defence policy in response has not, therefore, had to have been firmly rooted in the objective realities of planning an actual defence. Objectives other than national defence and security have become intimately associated with defence planning and the acquisition and allocation of resources for defence purposes. The attainment of non-military or political objectives have consistently, to greater or lesser degrees, characterized Canadian defence policy in the post-war period.

The lack of an overriding military imperative provided for conditions in which competition over the direction of foreign and defence policy have been intense. Competition within the bureaucracy for the direction of policy and in the case of the nuclear weapons acquisition debate the philosophical underpinnings of policy have largely involved the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence. Within the military bureaucracy, acceptance of the military rationale and imperative guided the approach to the formulation of policy both foreign and defence. Within the Department of External Affairs political considerations relative to Canadian liberal internationalism and sensitivities over sovereignty and influence were the prime considerations in determining policy. The inability to separate defence issues from political or diplomatic issues and vice-versa established the condition in which conflict and competition over the direction of policy was inevitable. In each of the issue areas discussed competition had intensified based on specifics of the issue. Matters pertaining to continental defence, the acquisition of weapons and weapons systems and finally the nuclear weapons acquisition debate were all characterized by elements within the bureaucracy pursuing differing and often conflicting objectives.

The final determination of foreign and defence policy during the era considered was based on which element of the bureaucracy was able to win greatest favour with the sitting government. To be sure it was not just non-elected members of the bureaucracy but also their elected ministers who perpetuated the lack of consensus and the competition it provided. The inherent problem with competition for governmental or prime ministerial favour is that realities of either a military or political nature can be ignored to the detriment of military effectiveness or the confusion of political goals. NORAD was not closely scrutinized by the Diefenbaker government or the diplomatic bureaucracy perhaps to the detriment of political goal and objectives in other areas. Moreover, indecision and delay over the acquisition of weapons and weapons systems, degraded capability and could have, in the event of unforseen emergency, had grave results.

In general, those conditions which characterized Canadian defence and foreign policy in the immediate post-war period continue to characterize defence and foreign policy today. Geographic realities remain a constant. Although bureaucratic competition over the direction of policy is less apparent today than during the 1950's and early 1960's, tension over the direction of policy remains. The 1987 White Paper on Defence sought to address the "commitment-capability" gap, a term descriptive of the gulf which arises when political objectives exceed actual means. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact will provide great impetus for change in the status quo as it relates to Canadian defence policy. The degree to which Canadian policy makers will render change remains to be seen, the cosy nature of Canadian geography notwithstanding.

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